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I. INTRODUCTION
When Carol Anne Bond discovered that her husband had
impregnated her best friend Myrlinda Haynes, she sought revenge.1
Bond, a trained microbiologist employed by a chemical manufacturer,
stole a supply of toxic chemicals from her employer and purchased
more over the Internet. 2 Over several months, Bond attempted to
harm Haynes by spreading these chemicals in her house, on her car
door handles, and in her mailbox.3 Haynes complained to local law
enforcement, but they did not further pursue her complaint.4 After
the matter was referred to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and
following a federal investigation, federal prosecutors charged Bond
with possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 229.5 Bond pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced
to six years in prison.6
The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court after Bond contended
the offense she was charged with was unconstitutional because the
power to prosecute crimes was reserved to the states and thus the
prohibition “violate[d] principles of federalism embodied in [the]
Constitution and the fair notice requirements of its Due Process
Clause.”7 The Third Circuit held that as a private party attempting to
claim a violation of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment,
Bond lacked standing.8 The question before the Supreme Court was
whether a criminal defendant convicted of use of a chemical weapon
under 18 U.S.C. § 229 may challenge her conviction on the grounds
that the statute is beyond the federal government’s enumerated
powers, thus violating the Tenth Amendment.9
The Court rejected the Government’s position, holding that there
was “no basis in precedent or principle to deny [Bond’s] standing to
raise her claims” that the statute she was charged with was beyond



1. United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct.
2355 (2011).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 132. 
4. Id.
5. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 229(a), 229F(1) (2006). 
6. Bond, 581 F.3d at 133.
7. Id. at 132.
8. Id. at 137-38.
9. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2360.
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Congress’s constitutional authority to enact.10 The Court expressed
no view on the merits of Bond’s challenge to the statute’s validity,
which is to be considered by the Court of Appeals on remand.11
Rather than ponder the decision’s constitutional aspects, this
Article focuses on the case’s implications for criminal law in general,
and on the enforcement of terrorism offenses in particular. As the
Court’s decision does not address any substantive issues arising out
of the decision to charge the defendant with a terrorism crime, a
central question emerges: How did this purely local crime, motivated
by rage and jealousy and perpetrated by a single defendant, result in
severe federal charges under a criminal statute directed to combat
politically motivated terrorism?
The Bond case highlights some critical, yet unresolved, questions
concerning the definition and classification of terrorism for the
purposes of enforcing the criminal law against terrorism. In Bond,
prosecutors misused a prohibition enacted by Congress to meet
American obligations under an international treaty to charge a
defendant with crimes not markedly different in nature, effect, and
defining characteristics from other types of “ordinary” crime normally
dealt with by the criminal justice system.12
Federal and state legislation does not contain explicit “terrorism”
offenses per se.13 Instead, various criminal provisions prohibit a wide
array of specified crimes that are commonly perceived as terrorismrelated offenses. These broadly worded offenses cover numerous
crimes that typically—though not necessarily—characterize terrorist
acts. Terrorism-related offenses may be divided into several
categories: One legislative technique involves focusing on the
technical measures used to carry out the attack, such as bombs or
weapons of mass destruction. Another technique involves specifying
an array of predicate offenses which constitute terrorism only if the
prosecution establishes evidence that they were committed with
intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population. This legislative
approach creates ambiguity with regard to whether these offenses
are limited to the terrorism context or cover additional crimes, which



10. Id. at 2366-67 (holding that “where the litigant is a party to an otherwise
justiciable case or controversy, she is not forbidden to object that her injury results from
disregard of the federal structure of our Government”).
11. Id. at 2367.
12. Id. at 2360 (“The Act implements provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their
Destruction, a treaty the United States ratified in 1997.”); see Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 6701 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 229 (2006).
13. See NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 93-96 (3d
ed. 2008) (noting that “neither the word terrorism nor any of its variants appears in” the
definition of 18 U.S.C. § 2332).
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share similar features with terrorism. This crucial question, however,
remains mostly unresolved under current law.
The decision to charge Bond with a terrorism-related offense
stems from a combination of two features that characterize the
criminal law against terrorism. The first is a doctrinal problem of
definition: the definition of terrorism, or its distinct features, is not
made an element of terrorism offenses. The second is an institutional
problem of classification: in the absence of legislative guidelines,
enormous prosecutorial discretion provides prosecutors with the
authority to misclassify “ordinary” crimes as terrorism.
This Article is not about the prosecution of actual crimes of
terrorism. Instead, its focal point is the prosecutorial
misclassification of terrorism offenses in cases involving “ordinary”
crimes, unrelated to terrorism.14 This Article argues that decisions to
bring charges against defendants under terrorism-related prohibitions
do not necessarily require the conduct in question to involve terrorist
acts as the term “terrorism” is commonly understood.
This Article’s key thesis is two-pronged: it suggests that,
empirically, the criminal justice system has failed to accurately
distinguish between “terrorism” and “ordinary” crime and that,
normatively, drawing clear legal boundaries between prosecution of
terrorists and prosecution of defendants who employ methods
capable of inflicting massive harm is a warranted and prudent
enforcement policy. It further contends that it is important to define
what is not terrorism just as it is important to define what precisely
terrorism is. Furthermore, accurately defining terrorism, as this
Article sets out to do, and making its distinct features an element of
terrorism-related offenses is critical for distinguishing between
terrorism and “ordinary” crime, due to the risks and unintended
consequences of prosecutorial misclassification of “ordinary” crimes
as “terrorism.”
Despite the seeming breadth of the law’s response to terrorism
following the September 11 terrorist attacks, legal reforms within the
criminal justice system have been concerned primarily with process,
such as the presidential authority to detain individuals without
trial.15 Rather than define the substantive elements of the criminal
prohibitions, the statutory definitions of terrorism impact mainly
“procedural,
investigation
authorization,
or
punishment



14. In this Article I use the term “terrorism offenses” to discuss terrorism-related
prohibitions. While these offenses do not use the term terrorism itself, they are commonly
understood to proscribe conduct that typically characterizes terrorism. 
15. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties: Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model
to Domestic Law Enforcement, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1623, 1627-29 (2004) (noting that
the Patriot Act gives the government powers “that traditionally have only been used in
foreign countries or for foreign intelligence gathering in the United States”). 
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enhancement.” 16 The majority of terrorism-related federal offenses
remained intact since the comprehensive legislative amendments of
1986 and 1996, and the legislative amendments that followed
September 11 made almost no changes in substantive federal
criminal law. 17 Most scholarship on the criminal law against
terrorism thus focuses on criticizing the investigatory and procedural
aspects of prosecuting terrorism.18
This Article suggests that such critique typically overlooks the
implications of the failure to make terrorism’s definition (or
terrorism’s distinct features) an element of terrorism crime on the
scope of substantive criminal law. Consequently, the question of
distinguishing “ordinary” crime from terrorism largely remains
unexplored in current legal scholarship. This Article attempts to fill
this gap by examining some of the implications of the substantive
prohibitions on the scope of the criminal law against terrorism. It
contends that the criminal justice system must clearly define
terrorism and explicitly make it an element of terrorism crimes in
order to unambiguously distinguish between “ordinary” crimes, such
as mass or serial killings, and crimes of terrorism. It further argues
that current terrorism statutes contain no internal mechanism to
restrict the application of the broadly worded provisions only to
terrorism prosecutions. The criminal justice system’s failure to
clearly define what types of crime amount to terrorism results in
blurring the line between “ordinary” crime and terrorism.
The institutional problem of classification is equally critical in the
area of terrorism offenses. Since the distinction between terrorism
and “ordinary” crime is not legislatively guided, the authority to
make these classifications remains solely in the hands of the criminal
justice system’s main institutional actors: prosecutors. A main
feature of the American criminal justice system is the enormous
discretion wielded by prosecutors.19 The failure to make terrorism an



16. See WAYNE MCCORMACK, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TERRORISM 58 (2007).
17. See generally Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.);
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). The picture is
different, however, at the state level, as many state legislatures passed terrorism-related
prohibitions following 9/11. See infra p. 818. 
18. See, e.g., Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1108-09 (2008) (discussing
two competing models for detention—the military detention and the civilian criminal trial
model—and noting that the criminal justice system has diminished some traditional
procedural safeguards in terrorism trials and has established the capacity to convict
terrorists based on criteria that come close to associational status).
19. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 506 (2001) (noting that the role that the definition of crimes
and defenses play “is to empower prosecutors, who are the criminal justice system’s
real lawmakers”).
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element of the crime provides prosecutors with broad authority to
classify what crimes ought to be prosecuted as terrorism. This
practice results in law enforcement shaping the contours of
substantive criminal law and taking over the role of legislatures.
Furthermore, terrorism statutes do not provide any mechanism of
restraint for how prosecutors exercise their authority, thereby
increasing the risk that these provisions might be wrongly applied.
An unintended consequence of providing law enforcement with too
much leeway in charging defendants with terrorism offenses is
prosecutorial misuse of these prohibitions. Unlimited prosecutorial
discretion leaves prosecutors free to invoke creative theories by
charging defendants with terrorism crimes in cases unrelated
to terrorism.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I traces the source of
prosecutorial misuse of terrorism statutes by pointing out the
anomaly that characterizes the criminal law against terrorism. While
federal and state law adopts various prohibitions that are perceived
to be “terrorism-related,” these prohibitions do not make terrorism—
or its distinct features such as the defendant’s political motivation—
an element of the crime. Instead, the terrorist nature of the crimes
is merely implied or inferred from their features such as the
technical means used to carry out the attacks or the scope of the
harm inflicted.
Part II examines the practical implications of applying terrorismrelated offenses in various contexts by considering court decisions in
which the prosecution relied on a different feature that typically
characterizes terrorist acts to invoke the terrorism theory. The cases
demonstrate that charging the defendants in such instances with
terrorism-related offenses is unwarranted and a misuse of
prosecutorial authority, because these offenses could have been
prosecuted under general criminal laws.
Part III describes the risks and unintended consequences of
prosecutorial misuse of antiterrorism provisions in light of the
defining features that characterize the American criminal justice
system, including the unconstrained discretion of prosecutors, the
rule of plea bargains, the local and decentralized nature of the
criminal law enforcement, and the political dimension of the legal
system. These perils include granting prosecutors the power to
enhance the severity of the crime and the penalty of “ordinary”
crimes, which results in sentencing disparities among similarly
situated defendants and the infiltration of bias against defendants
labeled as “terrorists,” interfering with the balance between federal
and local law enforcement, and opening a door to expanding the
reach of terrorism offenses to additional contexts such as drug
trafficking and gang crime.
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Part IV proposes legislative reform designed to constrain
prosecutorial discretion by clarifying that the defendant’s political
motivation should be the distinct feature that separates terrorism
from “ordinary” crime. The proposal aims to limit the use of
terrorism-related offenses only to actual crimes of terrorism by
making specific intent to coerce governments to change their policies
or actions a necessary element of terrorism crimes.
II. THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM
The first Part of this Article traces the source of the problem of
legal ambiguity concerning what type of conduct constitutes
terrorism by laying out the theoretical foundation that frames the
subsequent discussion. The point of departure for evaluating
whether terrorism-related offenses are used only in actual
terrorism cases begins with the scholarly debate concerning the
definition of terrorism.
A. The Conceptual Framework: Defining Terrorism
The definition of terrorism is controversial and contentious:
voluminous scholarship addresses the term from multidisciplinary
aspects including political theory, foreign relationships, philosophy,
and international law.20 To date, there exists no consensus on the
definition of terrorism, and this term is used in different ways in
various contexts.21 Moreover, some scholars even suggest that it is a
political phenomenon, rather than a legal term, and thus cannot be
operationalized through precise legal provisions.22
Scholars, both legal and nonlegal, have long debated the question
of what constitutes terrorism. 23 Leading terrorism scholar Martha
Crenshaw argues that terrorism “is a method or system used by a
revolutionary organization for specific political purposes. Therefore



20. See, e.g., MARTHA CRENSHAW, EXPLAINING TERRORISM: CAUSES, PROCESSES, AND
CONSEQUENCES 1-32 (2011) (discussing the ambiguities in defining terrorism). 
21. See ABRAMS, supra note 13, at 62-75 (noting that there is no unanimous definition

of terrorism and the definitions of terrorism differ in what they include); Kevin J. Greene,
Terrorism as Impermissible Political Violence: An International Law Framework, 16 VT. L.
REV. 461, 462 (1992) (“[T]errorism has ‘no precise or widely accepted definition.’ ”); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM 13 (2006) (“Terrorism is simply the name of a technique: intentional attacks on
innocent civilians.”); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL
CONVENTIONS (1937-2001) 16 n.48 (2001). This Article, however, focuses solely on the
implications of defining terrorism for the purposes of enforcing domestic criminal law, an
area characterized by significant ambiguity regarding not only what terrorism is, but also
how it should be reflected in legal provisions. 
22. See Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 443, 446-48 (2007).
23. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 8-9 (discussing different scholarly views on
what conduct counts as terrorism).
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neither one isolated act nor a series of random acts is terrorism.”24
Other scholars also agree that political motivation is an essential
factor in defining terrorism, distinguishing it from “ordinary” crime,
typically motivated by greed, anger, and desire for domination.25
After attempting to differentiate terrorists from other criminals,
Bruce Hoffman defines terrorism as “the deliberate creation and
exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the
pursuit of political change.”26 Leading legal scholar Philip Heymann
describes terrorism as “violence conducted as part of a political
strategy by a subnational group or secret agents of a foreign state.”27
Heymann further notes that “terrorism falls into the category of
violent ways of pursuing political ends, a category that includes war
between states, civil war, guerilla warfare, and coup d’état.”28
Another feature of terrorism is a terrorist’s organizational
affiliation. This feature distinguishes terrorist acts committed on
behalf of a group from those of a lone perpetrator who engages in a
massive shooting spree. 29 However, scholars have also noted the
increasing role of unaffiliated terrorists, who may not directly
be affiliated with a group but still associate themselves with
extremist movements.30
Scholars continue to disagree about whether the definition of
terrorism should focus on the perpetrators’ wrongdoing or on the
target of terrorism, namely, the civilian population. Anne-Marie
Slaughter and William Burke-White, contending that the focus
should shift to the types of targets attacked, suggest that the principle
of civilian inviolability offers a better definitional approach.31
Indeed, one of the most critical features distinguishing terrorism
from “ordinary” crime is the targeting of civilians on the basis of their
group identity, rather than individual behavior or personal



24. See CRENSHAW, supra note 20, at 22.
25. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER C. HARMON, TERRORISM TODAY 7, 32 (2008) (defining
terrorism as “[t]he deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the
innocent to inspire fear for political ends”). This definition was first adopted in an
international conference on terrorism in 1979, and was further embraced by many authors;
for example, Harmon here quotes Benjamin Netanyahu, in TERRORISM: HOW THE WEST
CAN WIN 9 (Benjamin Netanyahu ed. 1986). See also ALEX P. SCHMID & ALBERT J.
JONGMAN, POLITICAL TERRORISM: A NEW GUIDE TO ACTORS, AUTHORS, CONCEPTS, DATA
BASES, THEORIES & LITERATURE 34-37 (2005) (providing a list of various academic
definitions of terrorism, including the political motivation element).
26. BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 40 (2006).
27. See PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMONSENSE STRATEGY
FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 6 (1998) (discussing different features of terrorism).
28. Id. at 8.
29. See id. at 7.
30. See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the
Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 437-46.
31. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International
Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 12 (2002).
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characteristics. 32 This feature distinguishes acts of terrorism from
“ordinary” crime in which the targets are individuals rather than
members of a nation. Criminal law, however, has historically focused
on defining perpetrators’ wrongdoing. Focusing on the targets of
terrorist attacks is therefore incompatible with the criminal law’s
paradigmatic role of condemning perpetrators’ criminal acts.
Moreover, the indirect and more critical targets of terrorism are
governments, whose citizens are attacked as a pretext for demanding
political change.33
B. The Doctrinal Problem: Terrorism Is Not an Element
of the Offenses
Since September 11, the American criminal justice system has
rested on the premise that terrorism is the most significant national
security threat.34 A Department of Justice document, “Department of
Justice Goals and Objectives: Fiscal Years 2007-2012,” states as one
of its objectives to “[p]rosecute those who have committed, or intend
to commit, terrorist acts in the United States.” 35 Implied in this
statement is a preliminary premise that the phrase “terrorist acts”
operates by a single definition that applies to all terrorism offenses.
Considering the wide array of terrorism-related prohibitions,
however, casts doubts on the accuracy of this premise. Moreover, the
above scholarly understanding concerning terrorism is not reflected
in the criminal justice system, creating a gap between the (mainly
nonlegal) scholarship on terrorism and the language of terrorismrelated offenses.
Federal and state antiterrorism legislation adopts many different
definitions of terrorism, each focusing on different features of this
term.36 These definitions, however, do not play a significant role in



32. See Alex Schmid, Terrorism – The Definitional Problem, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 375, 408 (2004) (noting the negative approach to terrorism, namely, defining what
terrorism is not: the definition excludes certain types of assassinations, where “the direct
victim is the only target, as opposed to de-individuated murder where the victim serves
only as message generator to reach a wider audience”).
33. Id. at 403-04 (summarizing key characteristic elements of terrorism, including
“[t]he predominantly political character of the act”).
34. See generally Robert M. Chesney, Federal Prosecution of Terrorism-Related
Offenses: Conviction and Sentencing Data in Light of the “Soft-Sentence” and “DataReliability” Critiques, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 852 (2007).
35. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEARS 20072012: STRATEGIC PLAN: STEWARDS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 13 (2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/archive/mps/strategic2007-2012/strategic_plan20072012.pdf.
36. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2006) (stipulating that “international terrorism” must
“involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State” and must “appear to be intended . . . to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population; . . . to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or . . . to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping . . . .”). The U.S. Department of State designates a “foreign
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the criminal justice system, because the actual use of the term
“terrorism” in the criminal prohibitions themselves is very limited.37
Federal and state law adopts broad prohibitions aimed at fighting
terrorism without requiring the prosecution to bring evidence to
establish the terrorism connection beyond a reasonable doubt. The
majority of terrorism prohibitions do not make terrorism an element
of the crime. 38 Acknowledging that the concept is too contested,
legislatures avoid making terrorism itself an element of the crime
while having a political incentive to expand the scope of the crime by
allowing for the prohibitions to cover broader factual contexts.
Instead of making terrorism’s distinct features an element of
terrorism-related offenses, various provisions criminalize a wide
variety of crimes that typically characterize terrorism. The terrorism
classification is not legislatively guided, but implicit, as it may be
inferred from these features. 39 Erik Luna notes the ambiguity of
terrorism offenses by asking, “What makes an individual a terrorist:
Is it the severity of his acts such as the infliction of massive
indiscriminate harm or is it targeting innocent civilians?” While
federal criminal law does not contain explicit “terrorism” offenses per
se, various statutes use different legislative techniques to criminalize
terrorism-related crimes.40 In each of the following federal terrorism
prohibitions, a different feature that typically characterizes terrorist
acts serves to classify the offense as a crime of terrorism.
1. The Nature of the Technical Measures and the Scope of the Harm
Title 18 of the U.S. Code provides a chapter entitled “Terrorism”
that includes offenses such as homicide and use of biological or
nuclear weapons. 41 However, nothing in the definition of these



terrorist organization” based on three criteria: that it is a foreign organization, that it
engages in “terrorist activity,” and that its terrorist activity threatens the safety of U.S.
nationals or the national security of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 219,
8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006). The term “terrorism” is defined as “premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents.” 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006). This definition makes political
motivation an inherent part of terrorist activity, which most legal provisions do not
address, and requires an organizational affiliation, a feature typically lacking from other
statutory definitions. See also Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions
of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 256-61 (discussing various
criminal codes definitions of terrorism).
37. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 58-59 (discussing various terrorism prohibitions).
38. See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, 2004 SUPPLEMENT TO FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 89 (3d ed. 2004) (“Despite the fact that a number of
different definitions of terrorism or a terrorism purpose can be found in the federal
criminal laws, it is difficult to find a federal criminal statute that makes terrorism or a
terrorism purpose an element of a federal crime.”).
39. See Erik Luna, Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 71, 110-14 (2009).
40. MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 58.
41. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2332a (2006).
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offenses necessarily ties them to terrorism. The following offenses
offer examples in which the measures used to carry out the attack
determine the classification of the crime as terrorism, based on the
enormous scope of the harm typically inflicted. The prohibition
against the use of chemical weapons was adopted by the federal
government to comply with the requirements of an international
treaty, and its language closely adheres to the language of the
Chemical Weapons Convention.42 The offense proscribes any form of
use, threat to use, or attempt to use chemical weapons, 43 with
“chemical weapon” defined as a “toxic chemical and its precursors,
except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this
chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a
purpose.”44 The prohibition further defines “toxic chemical” as “any
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can
cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to
humans or animals.”45 Another example in that category proscribes
the unlawful and intentional use of explosives or other lethal devices
in public places.46
These criminal provisions neither make terrorism an element of
the offense nor state that these offenses constitute terrorism. Rather,
the scope of the harm intended, along with the nature of the
technical measures used to carry out the attacks—typically weapons
that cause massive harm—determine the common classification of
the offense as “terrorism.” These provisions therefore sharpen a key
question: Do these offenses necessarily and under all circumstances
proscribe terrorist crimes, or do they also cover additional crimes
that inflict massive harm on victims?
At first glance, the plain text of the statutes suggests that these
offenses may also be used to prosecute other types of crimes
unrelated to terrorism. Indeed, they seem broader in scope than the
terrorism context. While terrorists typically use these technical
measures, it is not always the case, as the statutory language does
not require the terrorism connection. If neither the prohibitions
themselves nor the headers limit the use of the offenses to the



42. 18 U.S.C. § 229 (2006).
43. Id. (stating in relevant part that “it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly—
(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire; transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile,
retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon; or (2) to assist or
induce, in any way, any person to violate paragraph (1), or to attempt or conspire to violate
paragraph (1)”).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 229F(1) (2006).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 229F(8) (2006).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 2332f (2006) (“Whoever unlawfully delivers, places, discharges, or
detonates an explosive or other lethal device in, into, or against a place of public use, a
state or government facility, a public transportation system, or an infrastructure
facility . . . with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or . . . with the intent to
cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility, or system . . . shall be punished . . . .”).

818

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:807

terrorism context, then terrorism is not a necessary requirement for
using these prohibitions. Under this theory, any conduct involving
the use of technical measures that inflict substantial harm falls
under the prohibition, irrespective of the perpetrator’s motive, intent,
or affiliation with a terrorist organization. For example, this theory
would enable using the “bombing of public places” prohibition to
prosecute a case in which explosives are used as part of a drugtrafficking operation. 47 This statutory construction enables the
prosecution to invoke expansive and creative theories regarding what
types of conduct qualify as “terrorist acts.”
The counterargument, however, is that despite the lack of explicit
statutory language requiring the terrorism connection, these
prohibitions do, in fact, constitute terrorism offenses. One possible
theory is that launching weapons of mass destruction should always
be considered either an act of terrorism or an act of war. Therefore,
classifying certain crimes as terrorism may be logically inferred from
the technical measures used to carry out the attack. Moreover, the
nature of the harm that flows from these activities—massive injuries
to a large number of victims—further supports the assertion that
these are terrorism crimes. Furthermore, the legislative intent and
the amendments’ historical context, along with the location of the
prohibitions—being part of the chapter entitled “terrorism,” and
subsequent to the terrorism definitions in § 2331—demonstrate that
these prohibitions were enacted to combat terrorism and therefore
ought to cover only crimes of terrorism.48
2. Intent to Coerce Governments or Intimidate Civilian Population
Another common legislative technique to criminalize terrorismrelated conduct involves specifying a wide array of predicate offenses
and requiring that they be committed either with intent to intimidate
the civilian population or, alternatively, with intent to coerce
governments. Following September 11, many state legislatures
adopted terrorism-related statutes based on this model. For example,
the New York Legislature passed the Anti–Terrorism Act of 2001,
which included article 490 of the Penal Law, entitled “Terrorism,”
defining various terrorism-related offenses. 49 It provides that



47. See ABRAMS, supra note 13, at 75-76 (discussing several applications of terrorism
definitions to demonstrate the ambiguities concerning what conduct qualifies as terrorism). 
48. Id. at 8-21 (describing the legislative history leading to the amendment of
terrorism offenses).
49. New York Penal Law section 490.25(1) provides in pertinent part, that “[a] person
is guilty of a crime of terrorism when . . . he or she commits a specified offense” as defined
in New York Penal Law section 490.05(3)(a) (including any violent felony offense defined in
New York Penal Law section 70.02 or conspiracy to commit such an offense) “with intent to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population.” A person found guilty of committing a specified
offense as a crime of terrorism is subject to a substantial enhancement of the penalty, as
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“[a] person is guilty of a crime of terrorism when” he or she commits
a specified offense “with intent to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population . . . .”50
Several scholars have lodged criticism against the criminal
prohibitions on terrorism, noting their overbroad nature and
unlimited scope.51 Erwin Chemerinsky criticizes the broad scope of
the definition of terrorism, focusing on the element of intent to
intimidate civilians or coerce governments.52 Chemerinsky contends:
This is an incredibly broad definition. Many lawful protests might
be seen as trying to coerce or intimidate government or civilian
populations. If they are large enough, they might even be seen as
dangerous to human life. An antiwar protest rally where windows
are intentionally broken in a federal building could be prosecuted
as terrorist activity. Most crimes—from assault to robbery to rape
to kidnapping to extortion—are intended to coerce.53

Chemerinsky further expresses his concerns over the government’s
extensive powers under the Patriot Act, which may expand above and
beyond the limited terrorism context.54 Moreover, Chemerinsky notes
that similarly broad criminal statutes are often used in additional
contexts that exceed the legislatures’ intent, and that the
government uses the Patriot Act’s provisions in cases that are
unrelated to terrorism as this term is commonly understood.55
Nora V. Demleitner also critiques the broad definition of terrorism
offenses, noting that some of the defendants charged under antiterrorism statutes do not fit the characteristics of typical terrorists.56
She argues that the different definitions of “terrorism” have resulted
in prosecutorial disagreement over what offenses are prosecuted as
crimes of terrorism and why, noting, for example, that federal
prosecutors have classified bank theft, drug violations and even the
explosion of a pipe bomb, as terrorism cases.57 Demleitner further
notes that while the distinctive feature of a terrorism crime is that it
is politically motivated, different statutes, even within federal law,



provided in New York Penal Law section 490.25(2). N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 490.25, 490.05
(McKinney 2012).
50. Id. 
51. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 1623-24. 
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1624 (suggesting that the broad definitions of terrorism are able to cover a
variety of factual contexts unrelated to terrorism).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Nora V. Demleitner, How Many Terrorists Are There? The Escalation in So-Called
Terrorism Prosecutions, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 38, 39 (2003).
57. Id.
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use various definitions of the term, leading to confusion over what
crimes amount to terrorism.58
The common thread that characterizes all terrorism-related
offenses is their overbroad nature. The broadly worded prohibitions
are vague and enormous in scope, covering a wide array of crimes
varying in severity and in their relation to terrorism.59 For example,
the open-ended phrase “intent to intimidate or coerce” offers a broad
criminal prohibition, which allows for a wide variety of activities to
fall within its scope. It is therefore not clear what prosecutors must
show to demonstrate that the defendant intended to “intimidate or
coerce a civilian population.” The term “civilian population” remains
undefined and, as scholars note, certain criminal activity by its very
nature has the effect of “intimidating” significant parts of the
population.60 Moreover, many “ordinary” defendants also intend their
coercive acts to influence not only their immediate victims, but also
others in the surrounding area. Under existing expansive
prohibitions these defendants might also meet the statutory
definition of a “terrorist,” affording prosecutors wide latitude in
bringing “terrorism” charges against defendants whose crimes have
harmed a large number of victims.
The above statutory language provides two separate paths to
establishing a terrorism conviction: the prosecution may either bring
evidence that the defendant intended to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population or, instead, prove that the defendant intended to
coerce governments. Making these alternative, rather than
cumulative, elements results in an expansive prohibition that
enables the prosecution to invoke the terrorism theory in a variety of
contexts unrelated to actual acts of terrorism. Had the offense required
establishing both elements concurrently, this would have resulted in a
much narrower construction of terrorism-related offenses.
Scholarly critique of overbroad criminal prohibitions goes above
and beyond the particular context of terrorism. Rather, the expansive
nature of terrorism-related prohibitions is merely an example of
larger problems in other areas of the criminal justice system,



58. Id. at 38. Demleitner suggests that one explanation for the need for increased
terrorism prosecution “might be for individual U.S. Attorneys’ Offices to appear ‘tough on
terrorism,’ which presumably leads to commendations and rewards. Another explanation
might lie in the Congressional budget process which holds potential financial rewards for a
Department of Justice focused on terrorism cases, which have after all turned into a
national frenzy.” Id. at 39.
59. See Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 1623-27 (noting the breadth of terrorism
offenses and their ability to cover a wide variety of situations).
60. Id. at 1624.
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particularly the federal system.61 Many scholars have long criticized
the overbroad nature of federal criminal prohibitions.62 In a series of
papers, Sara Sun Beale elaborately addresses the overbreadth of
federal criminal prohibitions, noting that too many federal offenses
cover too much conduct and many individual offenses are overbroad
and badly drafted.63 Beale further notes that the number of federal
crimes has increased tremendously in recent years, with federal
offenses covering a wide array of conduct already criminalized under
state law.64 In a series of influential articles, the late criminal law
scholar William J. Stuntz argued that the constitutionalization of
criminal procedure created a strong political incentive for
legislatures to broaden the substantive criminal law to escape the
stringent requirements of criminal procedure. 65 Broader criminal
codes, argued Stuntz, allow police and prosecutors to enjoy the
benefits of criminal law enforcement techniques in a wider range
of situations.66
Terrorism-related prohibitions, however, offer a context in which
the familiar problem of the enormous scope of criminal prohibitions is
further exacerbated. This problem becomes especially critical because
terrorism’s distinct features are not made an element of terrorismrelated offenses. To secure a terrorism conviction, the prosecution is
not required to establish the nexus between the crimes committed by
the defendant and his or her political motivation or intent to affect
government policies. The lack of legislative constraint limiting the
application of these offenses only to actual acts of terrorism enables a
variety of crimes to be covered by these overbroad provisions. These
theoretical concerns regarding the expansive scope of terrorismrelated offenses have materialized in practice, as the following case
law demonstrates.



61. See generally Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
703, 716 (2005) (discussing the problems of over-federalization of the American criminal
justice system).
62. See, e.g., PETER W. LOW, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 4-7 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the
overlap of federal and state criminal laws).
63. See Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1503, 1506 (2007) [hereinafter Beale, Unique]; Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of
Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 747, 768-73 (2005) [hereinafter Beale, Many Faces]; Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and
Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction,
46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 997-98 (1995) [hereinafter Beale, Too Many]. 
64. See Beale, Many Faces, supra note 63, at 754 (“As a result of . . . recent legislation,
the bulk of federal criminal provisions now deal with conduct also subject to the states’
general police powers.”).
65. See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 7-15 (1996) (discussing the effects of changes in procedural
criminal law on the scope of substantive criminal law).
66. See Stuntz, supra note 19, at 509 (“As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and
adjudication pass into the hands of police and prosecutors.”).
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III. THE CASE LAW: TERRORISM CHARGES IN VARIOUS CONTEXTS
The broad language of terrorism-related prohibitions raises
significant concerns that they may be used to prosecute various
crimes that are unrelated in any meaningful way to actual crimes of
terrorism. The following Part examines the body of criminal case law
that was prosecuted under terrorism prohibitions by considering
whether they were properly classified as crimes of terrorism.
A. The Technical Measures
Should the measures used to carry out a violent attack determine
the nature of the crime as terrorism, given the easy accessibility of
weapons associated with warfare or terrorism? 67 While the use of
weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, typically
characterizes terrorism, this is not always the case, as these
technical measures are sometimes used in other contexts.
1. United States v. Bond
In United States v. Bond, the case mentioned in the Introduction,
federal prosecutors placed a heavy premium on the technical
measures used by the defendant—chemical weapons—by charging
her with a terrorism offense.68 Bond, who attempted to intoxicate her
romantic rival, was charged with unlawfully using chemical weapons
for a localized crime that was not different from any other “ordinary”
crime.69 Moreover, the case was prosecuted under federal law rather
than under state law.70
The Bond case, in which the defendant purchased the “chemical
weapons” over the Internet, demonstrates why the means used to
carry out the crime proves a wrong measure in classifying a crime as
terrorism. While the use of chemical weapons is typically associated
with terrorism, the same technical measures may also be used in
other factual contexts. Indeed, no one would seriously contend that a
defendant’s attempt to intoxicate her romantic rival amounts to an
act of terrorism. However, the fact that the attempt to harm
was carried out through technical measures that typically
characterize terrorism enabled prosecutors to charge Bond with a
terrorism offense.



67. See ABRAMS, supra note 13, at 94-96 (discussing the prohibition against weapons
of mass destruction and raising doubts whether this prohibition is a terrorism offense “[i]n
all of the possible factual contexts in which the described offense might be committed[.] In
other words, should the use of a weapon of mass destruction . . . always be deemed to
amount to a crime of terrorism?”).
68. See United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2009).
69. See id. at 131-32.
70. Id. at 132-33.
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However, critical features were overlooked in the Bond
prosecution. Recall that the scholarly understanding of terrorism
suggests that its defining characteristics incorporate the
indiscriminate nature of the attack, the political motivation, the
organizational affiliation, and the perpetrator’s intent to coerce
governments to change their policies. These defining characteristics
are missing in the Bond scenario: Bond specifically targeted an
identified individual; her actions were motivated by personal rage
and jealousy; she was not associated with any terrorist organization;
and her acts were not intended to influence governments.
During oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Alito
offered a hypothetical illustrating the scope of antiterrorism
legislation and its potential applications in cases unrelated to
terrorism. Justice Alito noted that given the breadth of the chemical
weapons statute, under a plausible reading of the offense, if the
defendant “decided to retaliate against her former friend by pouring
a bottle of vinegar in the friend’s goldfish bowl . . . , that would be
a violation of this statute, potentially punishable by life
imprisonment,” as vinegar causes toxic harm to animals and is
capable of killing them.71 While this hypothetical may sound absurd,
it demonstrates that the overbroad wording of the federal prohibition
on the use of chemical weapons enables prosecutors to charge
defendants in contexts unrelated to crimes of terrorism, such as the
case in Bond. Moreover, the factual background in this case suggests
that federal law enforcement prosecuted this case simply because
local law enforcement seemed uninterested in pursuing it, and the
federal prohibition against the use of chemical weapons presented no
legal obstacle in choosing this option.72 The use of chemical weapons
here thus served as a pretext for federal prosecutors to exercise their
authority and take over the state’s traditional role in enforcing
criminal law through local law enforcement.
2. United States v. Ghane
The federal prosecution of Hessam S. Ghane demonstrates
another example in which the severe federal prohibition against
possessing and using chemical weapons was wrongly applied. 73
Ghane, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Iranian descent, was admitted to



71. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355
(2011) (No. 09-1227), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/09-1227.pdf.
72. See Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2360 (noting that before she started using the chemicals,
Bond also engaged in harassing conduct of the victim and for that she was charged and
convicted under state law of a minor offense).
73. See United States v. Ghane, Criminal Action No. 03-171-HKV, 2011 WL 529645
(W.D. Mo. Feb. 7, 2011), aff’d, No. 11-1556, 2012 WL 752330 (8th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Ghane, 392 F.3d 317 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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an emergency room after contacting a suicide hotline.74 Ghane told
the physician he had cyanide in his apartment that he had acquired
during his work as a chemist.75 When asked if he would turn in the
cyanide he refused, stating that he “might want to use it later.”76 In a
psychiatric evaluation, Ghane expressed anger toward government
officials and told the psychiatrist, “you know I have access to
chemicals.”77 The hospital notified the police, who then conducted a
search of Ghane’s apartment and found a bottle with white powder
that contained seventy-five percent pure potassium cyanide.78
Ghane was prosecuted for possession of chemical weapons, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 229 (a)(1) and 229A(a)(1). At trial, Ghane
“testified that he never intended to use the cyanide to harm anyone[,]
. . . assert[ing] that he suffered from severe depression, and that he
[kept] the cyanide in case he ever decided to commit suicide.”79 After
the court held that the defendant was competent to stand trial,80 the
jury convicted him of criminal possession of potassium cyanide. The
court rejected the claims that § 229 was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad and that the jury instructions were erroneous because they
enabled conviction even if the defendant intended to use the cyanide
for a peaceful purpose, and the conviction was upheld.81
The prosecution’s theory that Ghane’s conduct met the definition
of the terrorism-related offense relied heavily on Ghane’s expression
of “anger toward unnamed government officials” and on his
statement that he might use the chemicals in his possession. 82 It
should be noted that § 229 prohibits both the possession as well as
the use of chemical weapons and that Ghane was charged under the
former element. Moreover, while the unlawful conduct under § 229
also includes threatening to use chemical weapons, Ghane’s
statement fell short of an actual threat to use the chemicals, since he
did not specify any type of action that he might take against any
particular individual.
In contrast with the Bond case, in which the defendant used
chemicals with the intent to harm his victim, Ghane’s intention was
to harm only himself. Moreover, in contrast with the Bond case in
which the defendant’s acts amounted to “ordinary” crimes, invoking
the terrorism theory in this case criminalized conduct that is not a
crime under “ordinary” criminal law.


74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Ghane, 392 F.3d at 318.
Ghane, 2011 WL 529645, at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. 
United States v. Ghane, 593 F.3d 775, 776 (2009).
See Ghane, 2011 WL 529645 at *7.
See id. at *2.
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B. The Scope of the Harm Intended or Inflicted
Criminal law theory rests on the assumption that the scope of the
harm inflicted or intended by a defendant ought to determine his or
her criminal liability. 83 Under this theory, greater harm justifies
placing greater criminal liability on the defendant. 84 Applying this
rationale in the terrorism context suggests that the defendant’s
intent to inflict massive harm on a large and random group of people
justifies imposing greater criminal liability by charging him with
the more severe terrorism-related offenses, rather than with
“ordinary” crimes.
The above assertion raises the question of whether the scope of
the harm intended or inflicted ought to determine the classification of
certain offenses as terrorism-related crimes. If so, where should the
legal boundary be drawn between crimes of mass killings, such as
shooting sprees in public places, and terrorist crimes? For example,
the recent rampage killing in a Colorado movie theater sharpens the
distinction between acts of terrorism and massive killings.85 In this
case, James Holmes is accused not only of killing 12 people and
injuring 58 others, but also of laying explosive booby traps in his
Aurora apartment that appeared designed to kill police officers who
arrived at the scene.86 Holmes faces multiple murder charges, rather
than terrorism charges.87 However, while the prevailing paradigm is
that mass or serial killers are not typically considered terrorists,
several prosecutorial attempts have been made to challenge this
paradigm in cases where the state argued that shooting rampages in
public places amounted to acts of terrorism. 88
In addition, those cases in which massive harm on a large group of
people was inflicted or intended also raise the question of the proper
legal construction of the phrase “intent to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population.” Recall that terrorism involves not only the
infliction of harm on random targets, but also the intent to intimidate
the public at large.89 Recall also that many prohibitions criminalize,
as one form of terrorism offenses, a wide array of conducts which are
committed with “intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian



83. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Hate Crimes: Crimes of Motive, Character, or Group
Terror?, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 605, 614 (contending that the scope of the harm
intended or inflicted ought to determine the criminal liability or the grading of an offense).
84. Id.
85. Dan Frosch & Jack Healy, Suspect in Colorado Theater Shooting Appears
in Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/24/us/
suspect-in-colorado-shooting-in-court.html.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 8 n.11.
89. See supra Part I.A.1.

826

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:807

population.” 90 The precise reading of this open-ended phrase,
however, remains unclear, as the following cases demonstrate.
1. United States v. Muhammad
In Muhammad v. Commonwealth,91—commonly referred to as “the
Beltway Snipers” case—a Virginia jury convicted Muhammad, the
mastermind behind a 47-day-long shooting spree, of terrorism
offenses under the Virginia terrorism statute, in addition to
convicting him of “ordinary” murder charges.92 Muhammad was also
tried and convicted of six counts of first-degree murder by a
Maryland county court, and his sentences were to be served
consecutively with the Virginia court’s death sentence.93 Muhammad
appealed his conviction but the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
upheld it. 94 The minor co-perpetrator, seventeen-year-old Malvo,
agreed to testify against Muhammad and entered a guilty plea to
first-degree murders. Malvo’s testimony provided critical evidence in
establishing Muhammad’s conviction, after the trial court found his
testimony to be generally reliable. 95
The charges against Muhammad exemplify a case in which the
scope of the harm intended and inflicted, along with the defendants’
intent to intimidate the public at large, rendered the murders
“terrorism.” The prosecution in this case invoked the theory that a
massive shooting spree aimed at a large number of unidentified
innocent victims qualifies as an act of terrorism. 96 Revisiting the
facts of this case, however, casts significant doubts on the accuracy of
this account.97
In his testimony, Malvo said that Muhammad had acquainted him
with the teachings of Islam and had trained him in shooting high-



90. See supra Part I.B.2.
91. Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 619 S.E.2d 16, 24 (Va. 2005).
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.4 (West 2011) (defining an act of terrorism as “an act of
violence . . . committed with the intent to (i) intimidate the civilian population at large; or
(ii) influence the conduct or activities of the government of the United States . . .”)
(emphasis added). The Muhammad case is markedly different from most terrorism
prosecutions: while terrorism cases are typically handled by federal prosecutors who
charge defendants with federal terrorism offenses, Muhammad was prosecuted under a
Virginia state terrorism statute. 
93. Muhammad v. State, 934 A.2d 1059, 1059 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).
94. Id. at 1060.
95. Id. at 1078 (“The only inconsistency in Malvo’s statements . . . concerned the detail
of whether he or Muhammad had been the actual triggerman on various occasions.”).
96. See Muhammad, 619 S.E.2d, at 35-36. “[Muhammad’s] attorneys argued for
dismissal of the terrorism charge on the ground that all potential jurors were alleged
victims of the crime. The prosecution countered with an agreement to a change of venue
outside the area of killings.” MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 19. 
97. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 19 (suggesting that the Muhammad
prosecution exemplifies the “potential for definition confusion”).
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powered rifles, including sniper tactics.98 Malvo further testified that
Muhammad took him to Washington D.C. where Muhammad’s
ex-wife and kids lived, and told him that they were going to “terrorize
these people.”99 Malvo further described how Muhammad had chosen
Montgomery County, Maryland as “the perfect area to terrorize”
because “it was lower to upper middle class, well-off, mostly
whites.”100 Malvo then proceeded to testify how he and Muhammad
chose their targets, and described in detail each of the shootings.101
Malvo’s elaborate testimony sheds critical light on Muhammad’s
plan and motive for the murders and calls into question
characterizing the shooting rampage as “terrorism.” Malvo’s
testimony reveals that Muhammad chose the crime scene for two
reasons: Montgomery County was predominantly populated by white
affluent people, and Muhammad’s wife lived in the area. Malvo’s
testimony therefore suggests that Muhammad’s killings were driven
by a double motive: rage and revenge combined with racial hatred.
Malvo’s testimony portrays Muhammad as a crazed perpetrator
whose motives were personal, rather than political. All the evidence
in Muhammad’s trial thus points to a personal act of rage as the
critical factor in the shootings.
Furthermore, nothing in Malvo’s testimony supports the
prosecution’s theory that the killing rampage was in fact an act of
terrorism. While Malvo’s testimony revealed that Muhammad was
heavily influenced by Islam, there was no proof that Muhammad was
affiliated with a terrorist organization or intended to coerce the
government to change its actions or policies.
The facts of this case may, however, point to a hate crime. A hate
crime requires the prosecution to establish that the victim was
selected by reason of his or her race, color, religion, national origin, or
sexual orientation. 102 A recurring theme in Malvo’s testimony is
Muhammad’s racial motive in committing the murders, something
the prosecution chose to ignore, placing instead a premium on
Muhammad’s beliefs in Islam.



98. Muhammad, 934 A.2d at 1076.
99. Id. at 1077.
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 1078. Muhammad and Malvo’s murder spree expanded to several
jurisdictions other than Montgomery County. However, the epicenter of the killings
occurred in Montgomery County. The defendants also murdered four other victims in
Virginia, Alabama, and Washington, D.C., for which they were also convicted. See
Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 619 S.E.2d 16, 24 (Va. 2005).
102. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1993) (upholding the
constitutionality of a statute which enhanced a defendant’s sentence whenever the
defendant intentionally selects his victim based on the victim’s characteristics such as race
or nationality).
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2. State v. Halder
Shooting rampages at schools offer another example in which
prosecutors attempt to invoke the terrorism theory. However, in the
case against Biswanath Halder, the state of Ohio’s reliance on the
terrorism classification proved unsuccessful after the court rejected
the prosecution’s theory.103 The case involved a shooting rampage at
Case Western Reserve University on May 9, 2003. 104 A video
surveillance camera recorded Halder, a sixty-four year-old former
student, carrying two handguns into the University building. 105 In
the video, Halder was seen shooting the first person he encountered,
proceeding to shoot indiscriminately both at random occupants in the
building as well as at police forces who arrived at the scene.106 Halder
further held hostage all the occupants of the building, for about eight
hours, eventually surrendering to the police.107
Initially, a grand jury returned a 338 count indictment against
Halder, including, among others, aggravated murder with firearm,
felony murder, mass murder, terrorism specifications, and multiple
counts of attempted murder.108 After the State presented its evidence,
and before jury deliberations, the trial court dismissed the terrorism
charge, holding that “the attack against a ‘small, random’ group of
people in the business school building did not constitute a terrorist
attack as defined by Ohio law.” 109 The jury subsequently found
Halder guilty of several crimes, including capital murder, aggravated
murder, aggravated burglary, and kidnapping. Ohio law defines
terrorism as committing crimes with “a purpose to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population.” 110 The Halder prosecution thus



103. State v. Halder, 2007-Ohio-5940, No. 87974, 2007 WL 3286904, at *4 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 8, 2007).
104. Id. at *1.
105. Id. at *1-2.
106. Id. at *1. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. “The grand jury also indicted Halder on thirty-five counts of attempted murder
with three and five year firearm specifications, and fourteen counts of aggravated burglary
with firearm specifications.” Id. Prior to the commencement of trial, the trial court dismissed
[136] counts of the indictment,” leaving intact a 202-count indictment. See id. at *4.
109. Thomas J. Sheeran, Judge: Case Western Rampage Not Terrorism,
AP
ONLINE
REGIONAL
US
(Dec.
15,
2005),
available
at
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-12053336_ITM.
110. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.21 (LexisNexis 2011); see also id. § 2909.24. Ohio’s
law defines terrorism as follows: “(A) ‘Act of terrorism’ means an act that is committed
within or outside the territorial jurisdiction of this state or the United States, that
constitutes a specified offense if committed in this state or constitutes an offense in any
jurisdiction within or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States containing all
of the essential elements of a specified offense, and that is intended to do one or more of the
following: (1) Intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (2) Influence the policy of any
government by intimidation or coercion; (3) Affect the conduct of any government by the
act that constitutes the offense.” Id. § 2909.21. Having defined an “act of terrorism,” the
Ohio Code criminalizes “terrorism,” stating that “[n]o person shall commit a specified
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attempted to invoke the terrorism theory by arguing that Halder’s
shooting rampage was intended to intimidate or coerce a large group
of people. Considering the evidence presented in Halder’s trial,
however, characterizing the case as “terrorism” is erroneous: Halder
was convinced that a University computer lab supervisor with whom
he did not get along had hacked into his computer and deleted
thousands of his work files. 111 After the suit he filed against the
employee was thrown out of court, and ten days after the court
dismissed his appeal, Halder went on the shooting spree.112 Despite
his diagnosed mental disorders and delusional beliefs, Halder was
found competent to stand trial.113
The evidence reveals that Halder’s motive for the shooting spree
was purely personal: an act of revenge against the University
committed by a troubled individual with severe mental disorders.
Halder’s actions were clearly not politically motivated, and his
victims were not randomly chosen qua civilians. A personal act of
revenge committed by a delusional perpetrator does not meet the
defining characteristic of terrorism.
The Halder case demonstrates that the element of “committing a
crime with a purpose to intimidate a civilian population” cannot
determine, in itself, the terrorism classification, since doing so
conflates the phenomenon of terrorism with the verb “terrorize,”
which can be too broadly construed.
3. Edgar Morales v. New York
The Morales case demonstrates a prosecutorial attempt to use, for
the first time, New York State’s antiterrorism law to prosecute a
gang member who killed an innocent bystander in a gun battle over
dominance in a Mexican-American neighborhood in the Bronx. 114
Following a fight between members of rival Mexican American gangs,
shots were fired, leading to the death of a 10-year-old girl and the
paralysis of another man. The evidence pointed at defendant Edgar
Morales, who was a member of one of these gangs, as having
committed these shootings.115
Morales was charged with first-degree manslaughter as crime of
terrorism, second-degree attempted murder as crime of terrorism,


offense with purpose to do any of the following: (1) [i]ntimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (2) [i]nfluence the policy of any government by intimidation or coercion; (3)
[a]ffect the conduct of any government by the specified offense.” Id. § 2909.24.
111. Halder, 2007 WL 3286904, at *2.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *4.
114. People v. Morales, 924 N.Y.S.2d 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011). I thank Professor Eric
Luna for bringing my attention to this important decision.
115. Id. at 63.
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and second-degree criminal possession of weapon as crime of
terrorism.116 The prosecution’s choice to charge Morales with crimes
of terrorism rested on the theory that an offense, which is committed
with the intent to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population”
amounts to terrorism.117 The prosecution argued that the defendant’s
acts were aimed at intimidating the “civilian population,” which
comprised Mexican–Americans residing in the area of the Bronx in
which his gang sought to assert its dominance.118
The jury convicted Morales of all charges, and he appealed. The
Court of Appeals rejected the prosecution’s theory, by holding that
the prosecution had not proved that Morales’s actions were
committed with the intent required under New York’s antiterrorism
statute, thus turning his offenses into crimes of terrorism. 119
Furthermore, the court held that even under the assumption that the
Mexican American residents of the particular neighborhood may
qualify as ‘a civilian population’ under the above statute, the
evidence did not establish that Morales committed his crimes with
the intent to intimidate or coerce that ‘civilian population’ generally,
as opposed to the very limited group of members of rival gangs.120
Consequently, the court substituted convictions for lesser-included
offenses for the terrorism charges and remanded for resentencing.121
The significance of the Morales decision lies in thwarting the
prosecutorial attempt to expand the scope of antiterrorism law to
cover “ordinary” street crime. Unlike the majority of criminal cases,
which resolve in plea bargains,122 the Morales case was resolved in a
jury trial, and ultimately the terrorism charges were reduced by the
Court of Appeals. The result might have been different had Morales
accepted a plea bargain and waived his right to an appellate court
review. Upholding Morales’ convictions of terrorism offenses would
have resulted in a significant expansion of antiterrorism law to
include “ordinary” crimes unrelated to terrorism, in particular those
committed by large-scale organized criminal groups.
On appeal, the Morales court adopted a narrow construction of the
open-ended element “intimidate or coerce a civilian population,” a
phrase which hypothetically could apply to any form of criminal
activity. First, the Court points out that to constitute a crime of



116. In addition, Morales was charged with second-degree conspiracy. Id.
117. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25(1) (McKinney 2012) (“A person is guilty of a crime of
terrorism when, with intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the
policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a unit of
government by murder, assassination or kidnapping, he or she commits a specified offense.”).
118. Morales, 924 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
119. Id. at 66.
120. Id. at 68.
121. Id. at 65.
122. See infra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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terrorism, the “civilian population” targeted by the actor must be a
group of people other than the direct victims of the crime.123 The court
further notes that construing the term “with intent to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population” to include the intent to intimidate or
coerce the direct victims of a particular crime would result in viewing
any specified offense involving intimidation or coercion of a group of
people, such as a bank robbery, as a crime of terrorism.124
Second, the court examined the specific context of the AntiTerrorism Act, holding that the statutory language weighs against
expanding its scope to include a narrowly defined subcategory of
individuals.125 The court cites the legislative history of the statute to
support this construction, noting that the Legislature’s intent was to
cover exceptional crimes perpetrated for the purpose of intimidating
a broad range of victims, not a narrowly defined group of specific
individuals whom the defendant views as his rivals. 126 The court
stressed that in light of the legislative history, the term ‘to intimidate
or coerce a civilian population,’ implies an intention to create a
pervasively terrorizing effect on individuals living in a particular
area, directed either to all residents of that area or to all residents of
that area who are members of a broadly defined group, such as a
gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, or religion. The court therefore
held that a gang member’s intention to intimidate members of rival
gangs, without an additional intention to intimidate or coerce the
broader community, does not meet the requisite statutory standard.127
This decision, however, does not fully clarify the ambiguity
concerning the legal construction of the overbroad element: “intent to
intimidate civilian population.” Moreover, the court does not read a
political motivation requirement into the terrorism-related offense,
leaving the door open to additional prosecutorial attempts to invoke
the terrorism theory in cases where the defendant’s political
motivation and actual terrorist acts are missing. It thus remains to
be seen whether other courts would adopt a more expansive reading
of the terrorism-related offense or opt for a restrictive construction,
limiting the application of the statute only to the terrorism context.
4. State of New York v. Ferhani
On May 11, 2011, the New York Police Department arrested
Ahmed Ferhani and Mohamed Mamdouh for conspiring to attack a
Manhattan synagogue and for buying gun, ammunition and an inert


123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Morales, 924 N.Y.S.2d at 67. 
Id. at 66 n.8.
Id. at 67.
Id. 
Id. at 68.
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grenade to carry out the attack.128 The arrest stemmed from a sting
operation, after an undercover detective secretly recorded both
suspects ranting about their hatred of Jews and discussing a
synagogue attack. 129 According to the court complaint, Ferhani
suggested disguising himself as an observant Jew so he could
infiltrate a synagogue and leave a bomb inside.130
The Manhattan District Attorney’s office sought to charge Ferhani
and Mamdouh with severe first-degree and second-degree charges,
including conspiracy to commit terrorism and a hate crime; however,
the grand jury indicted the defendants with lesser charges, based on
the assertion that they had intended to attack the synagogue when it
was empty.131 While the terrorism and hate crime charges remained,
the conspiracy charges were reduced to a fourth-degree offense.132
This case brings to the forefront not only the issue of classification
of crimes into terrorism and “ordinary” crimes but also the proper
allocation of authority between local and federal law enforcement.
While terrorism cases are typically pursued by federal law
enforcement, this case was handled by local law enforcement. In New
York the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Force has been a central
player in terror cases following September 11, and the U.S.
Attorney's office is well-known for its successful prosecution of
several high-profile terrorism cases.133 While federal law enforcement
was made aware of this investigation, they declined to pursue the
case, and the Manhattan District Attorney's office brought charges,
invoking New York’s state terrorism law for the first time.134
The institutional allocation of authority between federal and local
law enforcement in this case calls into question the New York
prosecutors’ classification of the crime as terrorism. Not only did the
investigation fail to establish a connection between the defendants
and a specified terrorist organization, but the plot remained in its



128. Criminal Complaint, People v. Ferhani, No. 02461-2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 12,
2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/55306836/Ferhani-Mamdouh-Complaint.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See William K. Rashbaum & Colin Moynihan, Most Serious Charges are Rejected
in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A28.
132. See Indictment, People v. Ferhani, No. 02461-2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2011),
available at http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1592.pdf.
133. See Tom Hays, FBI’s Absence from NYPD Terror Bust Raises
Questions, NBC N.Y. (May 13, 2011), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/
FBIs-Absence-from-NYPD-Terror-Bust-Raises-Questions--121814244.html.
134. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25 (criminalizing acts of terrorism). Following
9/11, many states, N.Y among them, adopted legislation that is modeled after federal
terrorism crimes.
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early stages, without crossing the line between preliminary planning
and a criminal conspiracy.135
The common thread characterizing the prosecution’s theory in the
above cases is the focus on the scope of the harm intended or inflicted
or on the defendant’s specific intent to intimidate civilian population
to classify the crimes as terrorism. This harm includes both injuries
to the direct targets of the attacks as well as intimidating the public
at large.136 The prosecutorial choice to focus on this feature, however,
ignores the absence of other features that typically characterize
terrorism, mainly the political motivation and specific intent to
coerce governments. These examples demonstrate that neither intent
to intimidate civilians nor inflicting harm on a large number of
victims is a sufficient element to distinguish terrorism from
“ordinary” crime. In addition, prosecutorial attempts to invoke the
terrorism theory conflate the narrow category of crimes of terrorism
with the much broader category of acts of terrorizing. Terrorizing
victims, however, is an inherent feature in most crimes rather than a
unique feature of crimes of terrorism. Conflating the two thus leads
to unwarranted expansion of terrorism offenses to cover additional
contexts beyond the legislative intent.
IV. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: IMPLICATIONS
OF MISCLASSIFICATION
The following Part explores the institutional aspect of
misclassifying “ordinary” crime as terrorism: overbroad, unchecked
and essentially unlimited prosecutorial discretion. In the area of the
criminal law against terrorism, prosecutorial discretion goes too far,
enabling prosecutors to misuse terrorism offenses by charging
defendants with these offenses in a wide variety of contexts that are
unrelated to terrorism, as this term is commonly understood. The
following discussion focuses on the practical implications of accurate
classification of terrorism offenses and the perils of prosecutorial
misuse of these prohibitions.
A. Unconstrained Prosecutorial Discretion in Charging
Decisions in General
One of the defining characteristics of the American criminal
justice system is the enormous prosecutorial discretion wielded by
prosecutors.137 Scholars have noted that “[prosecutorial] discretion is



135. See Tom Hays, FBI No-Show in NYC Terror Probe Raises Questions, ABC NEWS
(May 14, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13601067#.T1g2R5h3J4E.
136. See supra Part I.
137. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2123-24 (1998) (discussing the common critique of American
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necessary in criminal justice administration because of the immense
variety of factual situations faced at each stage of the system and the
complex interrelationship of the goals sought. The issue is not
discretion versus no discretion, but rather how discretion should be
confined, structured, and checked.”138
Constitutional constraints generally do not impede the enormous
discretionary power of prosecutors in the criminal justice system.139
In particular, prosecutorial charging decisions are not subject to legal
constraints, and legality doctrines such as vagueness and
overbreadth typically have not served to constrain prosecutorial
authority regarding charging decisions in general, and prosecutorial
discretion in the context of antiterrorism law. 140 Reaching a
constitutional level requires a showing of a Due Process violation or a
discretionary decision that violates equal protection, such as a
charging decision that used impermissible criteria such as race or
religion. 141 Terrorism prosecutions, however, typically do not reach
that level.142
The main issue, therefore, is not whether these prosecutorial
decisions are lawless or unconstitutional, but whether they are wise,
prudent, and warranted. 143 Under current law, misusing the
overbroad prosecutorial discretion typically falls short of actual
prosecutorial misconduct. However, from a normative perspective,
it is an unwarranted prosecutorial practice with dangerous
practical implications, and thus should be better structured and
legislatively constrained.
Scholars have long critiqued the risks of overbroad prosecutorial
discretion. Sara Sun Beale, for example, addresses the effects of the
overbreadth of federal criminal offenses, noting that such legislation



criminal justice system that “the prosecutor is the controlling figure in the typical
criminal case”). 
138. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
683 (4th ed. 2004); see also Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the
Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010); Kate Stith, The Arc
of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420,
1422-23 (discussing the range of prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute and the authority
to prosecute). 
139. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470-71 (1996) (holding that a
defendant is not entitled to a discovery claim for a selective prosecution argument); Wayte
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (holding that, absent an impermissible standard
such as race or religion, prosecutors have discretion to decide who will be charged with
a crime).
140. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2719, 2731 (2010) (holding
that the plaintiff’s vagueness claim lacks merit, and that the prohibition against providing
material support does not violate the First Amendment).
141. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1366 (2011).
142. See supra Part I.
143. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 837, 838 & n.4.
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“gives federal prosecutors too much unchecked [unreviewable, and
virtually unlimited] discretion to select the few cases that will be
prosecuted and which offense or offenses to charge.”144
In a landmark article, the late prominent criminal law scholar
William Stuntz argues that the power to define criminal law is in the
hands of prosecutors, not legislatures. 145 Stuntz challenges the
prevailing assumption that substantive criminal law, as amended by
legislatures, defines in advance the conduct punished by the state.
He argues that the role played by the definition of crimes and
defenses in the allocation of criminal penalties is smaller than we
suppose and generally targeted “to empower prosecutors, who are the
criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.”146 Stuntz further contends
that this broad prosecutorial discretion is especially sweeping in the
context of federal law enforcement, due to the enormous number of
federal crimes that prosecutors choose from, many which are broadly
and vaguely defined. 147 These prosecutorial choices are critically
important because only a relatively small number of cases can be
prosecuted in the federal system, and criminal law is mostly enforced
on the local level.148 Stuntz suggests that since federal prosecutors
are not bound by local law enforcement’s obligations and community
pressure to prosecute “bread and butter” crimes, they are free to
pursue prosecutions based on personal and political agendas. 149
Federal prosecutors pursue particular cases because they find them
interesting or because they believe that they would best advance
their professional careers.150
Rachel E. Barkow contends that prosecutors serve as de-facto
adjudicators in the vast majority of criminal cases because ninetyfive percent of cases resolve in plea bargains rather than in jury
trials. 151 Prosecutors thus control the terms of confinement in the
current penal system. 152 Barkow further argues that the risks of
abuse of prosecutorial power are aggravated due to the combination
of law enforcement and adjudicative roles in a single actor. 153



144. See Beale, Unique, supra note 63, at 1509. 
145. See Stuntz, supra note 19, at 519 (noting that criminal law is “defined by law
enforcers, by prosecutors’ decisions to prosecute and police decisions to arrest”).
146. Id. at 506 (noting the role of prosecutors in the criminal justice system).
147. Id. at 542-46 (discussing the increased prosecutorial discretion of federal prosecutors).
148. See id. at 544 (noting that federal prosecutions amount to less than five percent of
total prosecutions).
149. Id. at 543 (explaining how federal prosecutors are able to choose cases based on
their “personal and professional gain and growth”).
150. Id. at 546 (suggesting that federal prosecutors are free to pursue high profile cases
or other professionally rewarding cases).
151. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009). 
152. Id.
153. Id.
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Moreover, no effective legal checks exist to police the manner in
which prosecutors exercise their discretion to bring charges and
negotiate pleas.154 This practice, in which prosecutors are the final
adjudicators of their own law enforcement policies, violates the
separation of power principle.155
B. The Heightened Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Terrorism Cases
Arguably, many of the problems identified above are not
necessarily unique to the terrorism context. In fact, they also
characterize many other areas in criminal law enforcement,
particularly federal criminal law. However, those general problems
that characterize the American criminal justice system are
particularly exacerbated in the context of terrorism prosecutions for
several reasons.
First, the problem of overbroad prosecutorial discretion becomes
especially critical in the terrorism context due to the lack of
legislative guidelines for what conduct constitutes “terrorism” and to
the unique role that prosecutors play in classifying crimes.
Conventional wisdom holds that these decisions should rest with
legislatures, whose role is to statutorily define crimes of terrorism. In
stark contrast with “ordinary” crime, however, legislatures have not
clearly defined what crimes qualify as terrorism, failing to reach an
understanding about the scope of this term. In the absence of
statutory constraints restricting the application of terrorism offenses
only to the context of terrorism, prosecutors are left with enormous
discretion to make these critical classifications, resulting in the
unchecked use of terrorism statutes against common criminals. 156
Prosecutors invoke the terrorism characterization based on features
they choose and are free to charge defendants with terrorism offenses
without establishing a causal link between the defendant’s conduct
and actual acts of terrorism. Given this leeway in making judgments,
prosecutors decide not only which crimes fall under the “terrorism”
category, but also who is considered a terrorist. 157 Consequently,
prosecutors are granted unwarranted authority to shape criminal law
against terrorism by drawing the boundaries of terrorism crimes.
Furthermore, prosecutors are neither the proper institutional actors
to make these classifications nor are they well equipped to carry out



154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Luna, supra note 39, at 114 (“[L]aw enforcement has been exercising its waron-terror powers at an increasing rate, with agents across the country using terrorism
provisions against seemingly common criminals.”). 
157. Id. at 109 (“Government officials sometimes employed sweeping definitions of
‘terrorism’ in classifying cases.”).
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such a task: if legislatures cannot agree upon a definition of
terrorism, why should prosecutors be more successful? Indeed, a
recent report found that federal entities classifying cases agreed less
than ten percent of the time that terrorism was involved in a
given prosecution.158
Second, the increasing role of a preventive approach in criminal
law enforcement further explains why the problem of enormous
prosecutorial discretion is aggravated in the terrorism context: the
justice system’s “war on terrorism” has resulted in a paradigmatic
shift in law enforcement policy. The American criminal justice
system has traditionally focused on a punitive approach, combining
retributive and utilitarian justifications for punishing defendants for
their past crimes. 159 The emerging terrorist threats and the
acknowledgement that dangerous conduct must be prevented before
harm occurs have resulted in a preventive model aimed at
avoiding future harms by thwarting dangerous conduct even before a
crime occurs.160
The early intervention and preventive approach has been used in
many other legal contexts, such as civil commitment of individuals
with severe mental disorders who pose a danger to society and
commitment of sexual predators based on predicting their future
dangerousness. 161 However, this approach aggravates the risks of
prosecutorial errors or misuse of prosecutorial power, as it
incapacitates individuals based on some future danger they may
pose. 162 Employing the criminal justice system before a crime has



158. See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse Reports, Who Is a Terrorist?
Government Failure to Define Terrorism Undermines Enforcement, Puts Civil Liberties at
Risk, Sept. 28, 2009, available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/215/.
159. See generally Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2001) (noting that “during
the past several decades, the [criminal] justice system’s focus has shifted from punishing
past crimes to preventing future violations”). See also Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified
Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 668 n. 401 (1998) (noting that “[a]t
the end of the day, moreover, the best conclusion is that our system of criminal liability is a
‘mixed’ regime in which courts and legislatures draw on both retributive and utilitarian
principles to justify criminal punishment”). 
160. See generally Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution
and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 429 (2007) (describing
the Department of Justice’s policy of prevention and early intervention before terrorist
attacks occur).
161. See generally Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U.
L. REV. 1 (2003). “While preventive detention is generally inconsistent with a preference for
autonomy when criminal punishment is an option, it is acceptable both for those who are
unaware of the criminality of their actions [(the mentally ill)] and for those who are
committed to crime and are aware that this commitment will very likely mean a significant
loss of freedom or death [(terrorists and particularly suicide bombers)].” Id. at 62. In other
words: those who are undeterred. Undeterrable conduct justifies preventive detention.
162. See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists,
and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 696, 704 (2009) (discussing objections to a preventive
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been committed risks the abuse of prosecutorial expansive discretion
and the misuse of the preventive model itself. Recall the prosecution
of Ahmed Farhani and Mohamed Mamdouh: While the defendants
were charged with conspiracy and terrorism charges, it seems
unclear whether their aspirational plot actually amounted to
operational conspiracy. Charging these defendants with terrorism
offenses expands criminal liability above and beyond conspiracy
liability, based on employing the preventive model to counter the
risks of terrorism.
C. The Implications of Distinguishing Terrorism from
“Ordinary” Crime
The failure of the criminal justice system to clearly distinguish
between “ordinary” crime and terrorism begs the following questions:
why does accurate classification matter for practical purposes, and
why is it important to distinguish between terrorism and “ordinary”
crime as long as both are covered by existing criminal provisions?
Indeed, in the vast majority of criminal cases in which terrorism
charges are pursued, the question is not whether a conduct is indeed
a crime but rather what kind of crime, namely, whether it is a crime
of terrorism or merely “ordinary crime.” In addition, terrorists
commit both terrorism-related crime as well as “ordinary” crime.
One reason why proper classification is critical concerns the
decreased protection of defendants’ liberty rights. Historically,
American jurisprudence has been committed to protecting individual
liberties in general and criminal defendants’ rights in particular,
focusing on the right to Due Process of law in criminal trials.163 Prior
to September 11, threats to national security were not a main
enforcement priority, 164 therefore the idea of granting deference to
the government’s national security considerations was largely foreign
to the criminal justice system. Since September 11, most discussions
on antiterrorism law have been based on the premise that trade-offs
must exist between civil rights and individual liberties, on the one



detention model, including the risk of error, and institutional abuses under a preventive
detention approach).
163. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (noting that: “Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects”); see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36
UCLA L. REV. 233, 304 (1988) (stressing the justice system’s commitment to protecting
individual liberties).
164. See, e.g., PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING
WITHOUT WAR 4 (2003) (“[B]efore September 11, the U.S was dealing with a terrorist
problem that . . . posed [only] minimal risks at home. The harm to U.S citizens abroad from
much more troublesome international terrorism was also very small.”).
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hand, and national security considerations on the other. 165 In a
criminal justice system that places a premium on fighting the “war
on terrorism,” the delicate balance between these two important
values often results in instances in which national security
considerations prevail at the expense of individuals’ liberty rights.
Classifying more crimes as “terrorism” tilts this balance in favor of
national security considerations.
The prevalence of guilty pleas and lack of data on the scope of
terrorism-related prosecutions further highlights the importance of
adopting a legal mechanism to better distinguish between terrorism
and ordinary crime. The overwhelming majority of criminal cases in
American criminal justice system are resolved in plea bargains.166
The U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky squarely
acknowledges this reality, with Justice Stevens noting that “[p]leas
account for nearly 95% of all criminal convictions.”167
While the fact that most criminal cases resolve in guilty pleas is
hardly any news, it carries additional risks for the purposes of
enforcing the criminal law against terrorism because of the unique
role that prosecutors play in this area by classifying crimes as
“terrorism” or “ordinary” crime. Most of the cases in which
individuals are prosecuted under terrorism offenses typically resolve
in plea bargains and therefore neither go to trial nor get reviewed at
the appellate level. “[While] the plea rate for terrorism cases is
[somewhat] lower than the plea rate for other federal offenses, which
on average . . . remain[s] above 95% . . . , a plea rate in excess of 80%
is [still] remarkably high. . . .”168 Consequently, there is a very small
body of criminal case law dealing with terrorism prosecutions.169
The potential dangers of limited case law on terrorism
prosecutions are far-reaching. To begin with, the scope of
prosecutorial misclassification of “ordinary” crimes as terrorism



165. See Kent Roach, Must We Trade Rights for Security? The Choice Between Smart,
Harsh, or Proportionate Security Strategies in Canada and Britain, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2151, 2151 (2006).
166. Only approximately 5%, or 3,365 out of 77,145, of federal criminal prosecutions go
to trial. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
2003, at 418 tbl.5.17 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 31st ed. 2005). 
167. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010).
168. Lucian E. Dervan, The Surprising Lessons from Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of
Terror, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 239, 241 (2011).
169. Id. at 241-42 (noting that “[i]t is estimated though that there have been several
hundred convictions” of terrorism crimes, mostly under the prohibition against providing
material support, “of which over 80% resulted from a plea of guilty”). Dervan further
elaborates on the two theories dominating scholarship regarding the plea bargaining
process. The administrative theory “argues that prosecutors have become so powerful . . .
that they now force defendants to accept plea bargains for which they alone . . . determine[]
the appropriate punishment.” See id. at 242. In contrast, the shadow-of-a-trial theory
suggests that “both prosecutors and defendants participate in the plea bargaining process
. . . [like a] contractual negotiation.” See id. 
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cannot be easily quantified due to a lack of empirical data and the
absence of judicial decisions that interpret the substantive elements
of terrorism statutes. Moreover, in a criminal justice system
dominated by plea bargains courts are deprived of the opportunity to
exercise meaningful oversight on prosecutorial discretion regarding
the use of terrorism statutes. In the majority of cases, the trial courts’
acceptance of plea bargains leaves prosecutorial power to misclassify
crimes as terrorism beyond the scope of appellate court review. The
only caveat is when defendants reserve their rights to appeal.
Consequently, neither legislatures nor the judiciary defines what
conduct amounts to terrorism, leaving prosecutors to shape the
substantive scope of the criminal law against terrorism.
Misclassifying “ordinary” crimes as terrorism, however, raises
both theoretical and practical concerns. Charging defendants with
terrorism offenses in cases unrelated to terrorism is a risky practice
that may lead to unintended consequences concerning both
substantive criminal law as well as criminal procedure law. Existing
scholarship, however, focuses mainly on the latter aspects, noting the
implications of using the expansive investigatory and procedural
authority granted to the government under terrorism-related
offenses in “ordinary” crime, unrelated to terrorism. 170 Norman
Abrams, for example, critiques the broad use of the Patriot Act,
noting that unlike previous terrorism-related legislation,
the PATRIOT Act did not add very much to the body of antiterrorism crimes. The main thrust of the Act was rather
directed to broadening and strengthening law enforcement
tools of investigation and procedures and methods that can
be used to attack terrorist groups and activities. While
many of the Act’s provisions are restricted to being used in
terrorism-related investigations, some of the tools can be
used as well against ordinary criminals and criminal
activity. The Act includes provisions that loosen the
restrictions on the government’s use of electronic
surveillance, loosen the secrecy that attaches to grand jury
deliberations, add to its authority to address money
laundering, give it additional procedural power in certain
kinds of immigration matters, and facilitate cooperation
between government agents focused on intelligence
gathering and those whose goal is arrest and prosecution.171
The government’s overbroad investigational and procedural
powers under existing terrorism-related statutes have been discussed



170. See generally ABRAMS, supra note 13, at 11-21.
171. Id. at 11.

2012]

WHAT’S TERRORISM GOT TO DO WITH IT?

841

in great detail elsewhere;172 thus, its implications for misclassifying
“ordinary” crime as terrorism will not be repeated here. Instead,
the following discussion will focus on some of the substantive
aspects of misclassifications and on its less explored risks and
unintended consequences.
1. Enhancing the Severity of the Crime and the Penalty
The most apparent implication of classifying a crime as terrorism
concerns granting prosecutors the authority to increase the severity
of both the crime and penalty. Scholars often criticize what has been
famously described as the “one–way ratchet” toward the enactment of
additional crimes and the criminal justice system’s harsher criminal
sanctions.173 Scholars further argue that the tendency towards being
“tough on crime” is unwarranted and unjust, contending that it
results in inequalities in the criminal justice system, since harsh
penalties affect mainly minorities and underprivileged defendants.174
The Bond prosecution aligns with this national trend of “getting
tough on crime.” The case demonstrates how a relatively minor crime
has morphed into a serious federal crime, which carries a
disproportionally severe penalty. It is indisputable that Bond
committed several crimes violating several Pennsylvania statutes,
including statutes that criminalize simple assault, 175 aggravated
assault176 and harassment.177 Federal prosecutors, however, chose to
charge Bond with a serious terrorism offense, thereby significantly
increasing the severity of the crime and the penalty.
Using the terrorism classification to increase the severity of
punishment is legislatively guided: under the Sentencing Guidelines,
terrorism serves to enhance the severity of the penalty. 178 The
sentencing commission promulgated section 3A1.4, which provides
for increasing a felony offense by twelve levels if the offense “was
intended to promote . . . a federal crime of terrorism.”179 To determine



172. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 162, at 694-95.
173. See Stuntz, supra note 19, at 509 (discussing the heavy-handed approach and the
over-criminalization trend). 
174. See generally William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1970-74
(2008) (discussing the reasons for inequality as a core feature of American criminal
justice system).
175. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2701 (2011).
176. Id. § 2702.
177. Id. § 2709. 
178. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 120004, 108 Stat. 1796, 2022. Under the Act, Congress directed the Sentencing
Commission “to amend its sentencing guidelines to provide an appropriate enhancement
for any felony, whether committed within or outside the United States, that involves or is
intended to promote international terrorism, unless such involvement or intent is itself an
element of the crime.” Id.
179. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4. (2011).
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what constitutes a “federal crime of terrorism” for the purpose of
applying the terrorism enhancement, courts must look to the
statutory definition in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g) which defines the term as
“an offense . . . calculated to influence or affect the conduct of
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against
government conduct; and . . . is a violation of one of [a list of thirtynine other criminal statutes].”180
In United States v. Thurston the court held that “the plain and
unambiguous language of the enhancement does not require
conviction of an offense defined as a ‘federal crime of terrorism.’ ”181
Rather, “in order to apply the terrorism enhancement, the court must
find that the offense of conviction involved or was intended to
promote an enumerated offense intended to influence, affect, or
retaliate against government conduct.” 182 Establishing the element
“crime of terrorism” is therefore not required in order to apply the
terrorism enhancement. In particular, the prosecution is not required
to establish evidence that the perpetrators committed the predicate
offenses with intent to influence or affect the conduct of a
government by intimidation or coercion or to retaliate against
government conduct. Instead, the Thurston court adopted an
expansive interpretation under which in order to apply the penalty
enhancement, the prosecution need only prove the defendant
committed the underlying offense with intent to promote a federal
crime of terrorism. 183
2. Sentencing Disparities and Lack of Consistency and Uniformity
A direct result of prosecutors’ authority to enhance the severity of
the crime and penalty based on the terrorism classification is
increasing sentencing disparities among similarly situated
defendants. Thus, one of the perils of prosecutorial misuse of
terrorism offenses is that it dangerously compromises the criminal
justice system’s uniformity and consistency regarding charging
decisions and the ensuing penalties in similar factual
contexts. Furthermore, treating similarly situated defendants
differently exacerbates arbitrariness and inequality in the criminal
justice system.



180. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2006).
181. See United States v. Thurston, Nos. CR 06-60069-01-AA, CR 06-60070-01-AA, CR
06-60071-01-AA, CR 06-60078-01-AA, CR 06-60079-01-AA, CR 06-60080-01-AA, CR 0660120-01-AA, CR 06-60122-01-AA, CR 06-60122-02-AA, CR 06-60123-01-AA, CR 06-6012401-AA, CR 06-60125-01-AA, CR 06-60126-01-AA, 2007 WL 1500176, at *7 (D. Or. May
21, 2007).
182. Id. 
183. Id. at *9.
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The overlap of federal and state criminal laws generally promotes
sentencing disparities among defendants, as a wide spectrum of
criminal conduct is now potentially subject to either federal or state
prosecution. 184 The choice between the two, however, can generate
dramatically different sentencing results, as defendants often fare
significantly worse under federal-law prosecution than state-law
prosecution. 185 The excessive discretion inherently built into the
criminal justice system thus creates unwarranted sentencing
disparities among similarly situated defendants. 186 The Bond case
provides an example in which the federalization of a clearly local
crime significantly increased the sentence, creating disparities
between this defendant and others whose conduct inflicted similar
harm. In Bond, the Government requested a sentencing
enhancement on the grounds that although Bond was a low-level
technician, she had used “special skill” in selecting the chemicals
used to carry out her crime. 187 The District Court granted the
Government’s request and sentenced Bond to six years in prison.188
“By comparison, had [Bond] been convicted under [Pennsylvania]
state law for aggravated assault, she likely would have faced a prison
[term] of [up to] twenty-five months.”189
Sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants and
lack of uniformity and consistency in charging decisions are not
unique to the terrorism context. Rather, these problems are common
in other areas in the criminal justice system, which is generally
dispersed and decentralized, therefore resulting in inherent
disparities in charging decisions.190 However, the problem is further
exacerbated in terrorism cases due to the fact that the decision as to



184. See Beale, Too Many, supra note 63 at 997-98; id. at 1015 (arguing that increase
in federal prosecutions overloads the federal courts system and inevitably results in
unjustified sentencing disparities); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization
of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 647-48, 668 (1997) (noting that disparities “are
most striking in cases involving frequently charged duplicative federal statutes, like drug
and firearms prosecutions”).
185. See Beale, Too Many, supra note 63, at 997 (noting the serious inequalities among
similarly situated defendants with regard to sentencing, and stressing that those selected
for federal prosecution are subjected to much harsher sentences).
186. See Beale, Unique, supra note 63, at 1510 & nn.34-35.
187. United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 140 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Erik Luna &
Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 1416 (2010)
(discussing the Weldon Angelos case, in which instead of bringing state charges, the
defendant was prosecuted under federal law, resulting in incredibly harsh sentence). 
188. Bond, 581 F.3d at 133.
189. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (No. 091227); see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2702(a)(4); 204 PA. CODE § 303.13.
190. See Luna & Wade, supra note 187, at 1416-18, 1507-08 (arguing that current
sentencing practices compromise the integrity of the criminal justice system, transferring
sentencing authority from trial judges to federal prosecutors who may pre-set punishment
through creative investigative and charging practices, producing troubling punishment
differentials among offenders with similar culpability).
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what conduct amounts to terrorism is not legislatively guided, but
rather rests solely in the hands of prosecutors. Moreover, it is
noteworthy that many of the defendants charged with terrorism
offenses are ethnic minorities, often naturalized American citizens of
Middle Eastern descent. As scholars have long noted, minorities and
underprivileged defendants are those who are most affected by
sentencing disparities in the current criminal justice system.191
One specific area in which the above problems are particularly
salient involves mass killings, such as shooting sprees. Take, for
instance, two cases involving sniper attacks on highways. Recall the
Muhammad case discussed above: Muhammad was prosecuted under
the Virginia terrorism statute, despite evidence suggesting that
personal revenge and racial hatred motivated the shooting spree. In a
similar attack a year later in Ohio, Charles McCoy shot randomly at
motorists over a period of five months, killing one victim.192 McCoy
was charged with aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault,
vandalism and improper discharge of a firearm. However, he was not
charged with terrorism offenses, even though a terrorism statute was
in effect in Ohio at the time, and despite state prosecutors charging
Biswanath Halder with a terrorism offense.193 This stark difference is
surprising given the similarity of both crimes. However, while
Muhammad, who was a Muslim, was prosecuted under the terrorism
statute, McCoy was prosecuted under “ordinary” murder charges.
Setting aside the fact that these prosecutions happened in different
states, both Virginia and Ohio had state terrorism statutes in force at
the time of the crimes. Might religious differences and ethnic
considerations account for this differential treatment of similarly
situated defendants?
3. Prosecutorial Bias and Prejudice
Many commentators have addressed the need for prosecutorial
neutrality, including “the notion that prosecutors should not be
biased in their decisionmaking.” 194 Generally speaking, the
requirement for neutrality means that prosecutors may not act out of
racial or ethnic prejudice or against a particular religious group for
reasons of its beliefs. As one scholar has put it, “Unreviewable and
unchecked prosecutorial discretion invites improper considerations,
such as bias, prejudice, or political considerations.”195 However, the
general requirement for prosecutorial neutrality does not provide a



191. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 174.
192. See Nathaniel Stewart, Ohio’s Statutory and Common Law History with
“Terrorism”—A Study in Domestic Terrorism Law, 32 J. LEGIS. 93, 93-95 (2005).
193. Id. 
194. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 143, at 850.
195. Beale, Unique, supra note 63, at 1510. 
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workable legal standard for how prosecutors should act, particularly
in cases in which religion may be a relevant factor to the charges,
such as in hate crimes.196
Terrorism prosecutions provide a prominent example in which
ethnic biases and nationality-based prejudices might infiltrate the
prosecutorial decisionmaking process regarding the charges brought
against a defendant whose conduct inflicted harm on a large number
of victims. The September 11 attacks and other crimes of terrorism
where particular groups are significantly more represented, namely
Muslims of Middle Eastern descent, have brought the issue of ethnic
profiling in terrorism prosecutions to the forefront of legal
scholarship.197 Scholars have expressed concerns over the increased
risks of racial, religious, or ethnic profiling in terrorism prosecutions,
worrying that such factors may expose individuals to harsher legal
treatment. 198 Additionally, research has demonstrated that
individuals have subconscious biases that can negatively affect
perceptions, behaviors, and judgments towards minorities.199 Given
the lack of statutory guidance on what conduct amounts to terrorism,
prosecutors are free to decide whether a crime qualifies as terrorism
based on their own personal beliefs and inclinations.
4. Political Incentives
The intersection between political considerations and the
enforcement of criminal law is particularly salient in the area of
terrorism-related prosecutions in two respects. The first concerns
political influence on legislatures’ incentives to adopt terrorismrelated offenses. In a series of landmark articles on the relationship
between substantive criminal law and criminal procedure, the late
William J. Stuntz argued that state, federal, and local politics
regarding criminal justice policy are infamous for their highly
reactive nature, demonstrating “the pathological politics of criminal
law.” 200 Stuntz argued that the combination of robust procedural
protections and a political commitment to social regulation through
crime control has led not only to pervasive exceptions to procedural



196. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 143, at 859-60. 
197. See generally PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, PROTECTING LIBERTY IN
AN AGE OF TERROR 101-08 (2005); Daphne Barak-Erez, Terrorism and Profiling: Shifting
the Focus from Criteria to Effects, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2007); Samuel R. Gross & Debra
Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002).
198. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Racial Profiling and Antiterrorism Efforts, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 1201 (2004).
199. See generally L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95
MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011) (discussing the role of subconscious biases in the Fourth
Amendment context).
200. See Stuntz, supra note 19, at 546-57 (discussing legislatures’ incentives in
expanding the scope of substantive criminal law).
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safeguards but also to an excessive ratcheting-up of the harshness of
substantive criminal law. 201 The one-way ratchet occurs because
politicians typically perceive procedural protections as interfering
with the effective regulation of crime, giving legislatures a strong
political incentive to pass overbroad criminal statutes allowing
law enforcement to exercise their authority in a wider range
of situations.202
In the terrorism context, state legislatures have been quick to
adopt measures to address the threats of terrorism. Following
September 11, state legislatures in thirty-three states and the
District of Columbia amended their criminal codes to include
terrorism-related offenses. 203 This type of legislation, typically
modeled after federal terrorism-related offenses, adopted expansive,
vague, and undefined prohibitions. Similar to federal legislatures,
and largely motivated by a political incentive to appear “tough on
terrorism” by expanding the scope of antiterrorism statutes and
allowing for them to cover broader factual contexts, state legislatures
also avoided including a definition of terrorism as an element of
antiterrorism offenses.
These legislative measures resonate with legislatures’ political
incentives for “fighting the war on terrorism” in order to satisfy the
American people’s demand that aggressive steps be taken to reduce
the catastrophic risks of terrorism and ensure their safety. 204
Legislatures, politically committed to respond to the public’s deep
fear and outrage by passing broad laws that build on these
perceptions of terrorism’s risks, further rely on the public’s
willingness to support these aggressive measures and on the public’s
perception that adopting broad terrorism-related prohibitions
provides significant benefits at acceptable cost.205
Political incentives, however, play a prominent role not only in
shaping legislatures’ policies concerning their criminal laws, but also
in affecting prosecutorial discretion regarding charging decisions due
to the unique political nature of prosecutors’ offices. An important
feature that characterizes the American criminal justice system is
prosecutors’ political accountability.206 The selection and retention of



201. Stuntz, supra note 65 at 7-15.
202. Id. at 7-20.
203. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.40 (McKinney 2012); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §
2909.21 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (West 2012). 
204. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism
and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 507 (2007).
205. Id. 
206. See generally Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States
Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 391-413 (2009) (discussing the history of the Office of
U.S. Attorney).
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chief prosecutors is markedly political in nature.207 Both federal and
state prosecutors are selected through partisan political processes:
U.S. attorneys are political appointees who are subordinate to the
Attorney General—a political appointee of the U.S. president. 208
District attorneys and state attorneys are elected by their
communities in a partisan ballot. Scholars note that the risk of
political considerations influencing prosecutorial discretion is
heightened in a system in which prosecutors are both politically
ambitious and ideological. 209 Furthermore, the nature of the
American criminal justice system, where prosecutors’ electoral
incentives are particularly notable, creates a problem of imbalances
in incentives because elected chief prosecutors often run on tough-oncrime platforms; thus, the pressures to ensure convictions outweigh
the rewards for respecting defendants’ rights.210 This reality results
in the political accountability of prosecutors, at the local, state, and
federal level.
Prosecutors’ political incentives are not unique to terrorism
prosecutions.211 Indeed, the risks associated with the infiltration of
political incentives into the prosecutorial decisionmaking process
demonstrate another aspect of the general requirement of
prosecutorial neutrality. 212 However, political incentives play a
premium role in terrorism prosecutions because of the high-profile
nature of these cases and their inherently political nature. Arguably,
the “war on terrorism” is heavily affected by political dynamics, and
classifying crimes as terrorism carries clear political implications. In
addition, characterizing crimes as terrorism brings on extensive



207. See id. at 409-12 (discussing the appointment and removal of U.S. Attorneys);
Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice, 16
GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 309 (2009) (“[B]ecause federal prosecutors’ political
accountability runs through the President, they are less directly accountable than their
locally elected state counterparts.”).
208. See Beale, supra note 206, at 409-10.
209. See H.W. Perry, Jr., United States Attorneys—Whom Shall They Serve? 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 142-44 (1998) (“A person who is seeking high profile cases and is
particularly ideological might be more tempted to use the power of the office for
partisan reasons.”).
210. See John Paul Stevens, Retired Justice, Address at Equal Justice
Initiative Dinner Honoring Justice Stevens (May 2, 2011), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/stevens.pdf (addressing the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Connick v. Thompson).
211. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 206, at 382-83 (discussing improper partisan political
considerations that influenced prosecutorial discretion).
212. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 143, at 869 (stating that one element of
prosecutorial neutrality is nonpartisanship, and that the decision whether and when to
bring charges in individual cases should be made regardless of partisan politics); see also
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
71 (3d ed. 1993) (“In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight
to the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which might be involved or to a
desire to enhance his or her record of convictions.”).
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media coverage and public attention, which provides prosecutors
with publicity and fame they would not have enjoyed had “ordinary”
criminal charges been brought instead.213
5. The Terrorism Label and the Effect of Fear on Juries’ Perceptions
Another implication of accurate classification concerns the role of
strong emotions, public panic, and societal hysteria in the context of
terrorism prosecutions. 214 Daniel M. Filler suggests that since the
September 11 attacks, fear and anxiety have dominated the public’s
perception of actors who are labeled “terrorists,” and therefore using
the “terrorism” rhetoric critically influences public perceptions of
crime and punishment.215 Erik Luna addresses the role of the public’s
emotions in the criminal justice system, suggesting that the history
of society’s “moral panic” demonstrates “the power of fear and hatred
in social and political action.” 216 More specifically, Luna uses the
example of America’s “war on terror” to demonstrate the way in
which powerful emotions, particularly hatred and fear, often prevail
over rational legal doctrines, resulting in “significant deviations in
criminal law and procedure.”217
The terrorism classification, along with the “war on terrorism”
rhetoric, may also affect juries’ and judges’ perceptions regarding the
adjudication of terrorism crimes. The public’s deep fear of “terrorists”
plays a significant role in institutional actors’ perceptions of crime.
Invoking the terrorism rubric, along with labeling the defendant a
“terrorist,” may trigger emotional responses that affect jurors’
decisions regarding conviction and punishment.
Prominent scholars have addressed the role of cultural cognition
theory on a juror’s decisionmaking process. 218 Under this theory,
individuals tend to conform their perceptions of legally consequential
facts to their defining group commitments. 219 In the context of



213. See, for example, the extensive media coverage of the recent terrorism prosecution
of Ahmed Ferhani and Mohamed Mamdouh. See, e.g., Karen Freifeld, Two
Indicted, Plead Not Guilty in Plot to Bomb Synagogues, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(June
15,
2011,
3:31
PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-06-15/
two-indicted-plead-not-guilty-in-plot-to-bomb-synagogues.html.
214. See, e.g., Demleitner, supra note 56, at 42 (“[T]he increased application of the term
[terrorism] may augment public insecurity and create unnecessary alarm over run-of-themill criminal activity.”).
215. See generally Daniel M. Filler, Terrorism, Panic, and Pedophilia, 10 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 345, 367-69 (2003) (addressing the potential links between terrorism and
pedophilia, a connection that stems from using the sexual predators rhetoric with respect
to terrorists). Filler fears that social anxieties and moral panics may lead to application of
anti-pedophilia policies to those that the public associates with terrorism. See id. at 345-46. 
216. See Luna, supra note 39, at 73-74. 
217. Id. at 74.
218. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What,
and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (2010). 
219. See id. at 753-67.
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terrorism prosecutions, personal dispositions, biases, and emotions
may prove stronger than legal doctrines in making decisions about
innocence and guilt; jurors may either identify themselves with the
large group of Americans who fell prey to terrorism or view
themselves as potential targets of future terrorist attacks. Moreover,
labeling defendants as “terrorists” effectively increases the chances of
conviction, because jurors are likely to grant deference to national
security considerations and accept government policy judgments
regarding what types of conduct constitute threats to national
security, as well as to their own personal security.
6. Tilting the Balance Between Localism and Federalism
Terrorism prosecutions provide a poignant example of the complex
relationship between local and federal law enforcement. On the one
hand, one of “[t]he defining characteristic[s] of [the] American
criminal [justice system] . . . is its localism.”220 Scholars note that the
American criminal justice system relies more on local than
centralized decisionmaking in law enforcement, resulting in a
dispersed and decentralized criminal court system.221 On the other
hand, federal offenses cover a wide array of conduct that is already
criminalized under state law. 222 While federal law authorizes the
prosecution of many forms of localized crime, federal prosecutors are
able to handle only a small fraction of these cases, leaving the vast
majority of criminal cases to local prosecutors.223
Classifying crimes as “terrorism” alters this delicate balance in
favor of more federal prosecutions of essentially localized crimes.
Such a practice resonates with a salient trend characterizing the
criminal justice system in general, in which federal law, with its
severe crimes and harsher penalties, increasingly dominates the
enforcement of criminal law, a role traditionally reserved to the
states, and particularly to local law enforcement.
The implications of favoring federal law enforcement over a
localized criminal justice system are far-reaching: William J. Stuntz
noted that local law enforcement is constrained by both budget and
politics and is accountable for its prosecutorial policy in the eyes of
the local community. 224 Therefore, local prosecutors are bound to
prosecute “bread and butter” crimes such as murder, robbery, and



220. See William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, Federalism, and Police Misconduct, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 665, 665 (2002). 
221. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds
Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 545-64 (2011) (noting that states may
vest authority in either state attorneys or local district or county attorneys).
222. See Beale, Many Faces, supra note 63, at 754-55, 768 (arguing that
“overfederalization . . . tips the federal-state balance”).
223. See Stuntz, supra note 19, at 543-46.
224. Id. at 543.
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rape. In contrast, federal agencies, being less constrained, are not
accountable to the public and therefore less attentive to its needs and
concerns.225 Consequently, argued Stuntz, federal prosecutors are free
to pursue different agendas, which are often related to their personal
preferences, such as the advancement of their professional careers or
their personal interest in enforcing particular type of crime. 226
Scholars further note that the federal emphasis on terrorism
prosecutions has increased the reliance on states’ investigative
resources, both to coordinate with federal investigators in terrorism
investigations and to make up for the diversion of federal
investigations from other kinds of cases.227
Rachel E. Barkow considers the question of “when criminal
enforcement responsibility should rest with local [law enforcement]
and when it should reside with more . . . centralized actor[s]” such as
federal or state prosecutors.228 Barkow contends that “[t]he debate
over the federalization of a crime . . . boils down to a question of
sentencing policy and whether (and when) it is appropriate for the
federal government to step into an area of traditional local authority
over crime because of a differing view of sentencing policy.”229
Indeed, different sentencing policies among the federal and the
state criminal justice systems are conspicuous in the federal
prosecution in Bond. This case sharpens tensions regarding the
institutional allocation of prosecutions between local and federal law
enforcement, demonstrating the vast prosecutorial power to classify
not only which cases qualify as crimes of terrorism, but also whether
they are prosecuted under state or federal law. While in some cases
local law enforcement is legally unable to prosecute crimes because of
deficiencies in state law, this was not the case in Bond: here, the
facts of the case suggest that local law enforcement was simply
uninterested in prosecuting Bond’s crimes. However, a more
interesting question is what aroused federal prosecutors’ interest in
this minor case. One possible explanation may rest with the different
penalties under state and federal law. In the Bond case, crimes that
might have merited twenty-five months in prison under
Pennsylvania law were severely punished with a six year prison
term. The consequential nature of the choice between federal and



225. Id.
226. Id. at 543-44.
227. See Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism,
34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 407-16 (2006) (examining the federal, state, and local relations in
the law enforcement sphere, particularly after the 9/11 attacks, as a means of
understanding present tensions and the demands that federal agencies place on local police
that are inconsistent with their crime fighting mission).
228. Barkow, supra note 221, at 519.
229. Id. at 579 (discussing the policy choice between local and centralized
law enforcement). 
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state prosecution means that federal prosecutors have assumed
enormous power to charge local offenses in vastly disparate ways,
essentially shaping the criminal justice system’s sentencing policies.
7. Slippery Slope: Additional Applications of Terrorism Statutes
The combined effect of unlimited prosecutorial discretion and the
broad language of terrorism offenses may lead to additional
expansions of these prohibitions in factual contexts that are
unrelated to terrorism. Moreover, since rhetoric plays a crucial role
in the public’s understanding of crime, using the slogan “war on
terrorism” potentially opens the door for additional targets. This
possibility raises significant concerns that terrorism statutes may be
further misused in additional contexts, which exceeds legislatures’
primary intent to combat politically motivated crimes. One notable
example for such an attempt includes prosecuting gang members
under
terrorism-related
offenses,
as
the
Morales
case
demonstrates.230 While the New York Court of Appeals rejected the
prosecution’s theory that the terrorism-related prohibition may
stretch to include gang crimes, the criminal justice system is likely to
face some additional attempts in which the prosecution would employ
creative theories to bring terrorism-related charges against
“ordinary” criminals. Drug and sex trafficking are natural candidates
for such an expansive reading of terrorism-related offenses.
(a) Drug Trafficking
In the last decades, the criminal regulation of drug trafficking has
become a major goal of the American criminal justice system.231 The
phrase “war on drugs” was coined to address law enforcement’s
vigorous fight against drug use.232 Interestingly, the “war on drugs”
has often been phrased in terms of a substantial risk to national
security.233 The parallels between the “war on drugs” and the “war on
terrorism” suggest that prosecutors may try to use terrorism offenses
to prosecute drug traffickers by invoking the theory that drug
trafficking is one form of international terrorism. Take, for instance,



230. See supra Part II.
231. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & BERNARD E. HARCOURT, CRIMINAL LAW AND
THE REGULATION OF VICE 217-302 (2007). 
232. See id. at 217-18.
233. See, e.g., US: Mexico’s Drug War Posing Growing Threat to U.S. National Security,
HOMELAND SECURITY NEWSWIRE, Sept. 13, 2010, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/
us-mexicos-drug-war-posing-growing-threat-us-national-security (“The Obama administration
sees the drug-related violence sweeping Mexico as a growing threat to U.S. national
security . . . .”); see also Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Mexican Drug Cartels Threaten American
National Security, US NEWS, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/mzuckerman/
articles/2009/03/09/mexican-drug-cartels-threaten-american-national-security (discussing
the connection between Mexican drug cartels and threats to national security).
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a hypothetical in which a drug trafficking organization escalates the
measures it employs by using bombs for the purpose of trafficking
drugs from one country to another. 234 The broad wording of the
prohibition against bombing places of public use suggests that this
conduct meets the elements of this offense.
A bill recently introduced in Congress further supports this
theory; the bill proposes that six Mexican drug cartels be added to
the list of foreign terrorist organizations.235 These drug cartels would
be designated “terrorist organizations” as this term is understood in
the Immigration and Nationality Act.236 The bill is premised on the
assumption that international drug trafficking constitutes a threat to
the safety and security of the U.S. and its people, similar to other
forms of terrorism. Adopting a bill that equates drug trafficking with
terrorism carries far-reaching practical implications that exceed the
scope of this Article.
(b) Sex Trafficking
In a provocative paper, Catharine A. MacKinnon compares the
“war on terrorism” paradigm with violence against women. 237
MacKinnon points out that in both cases, nonstate actors commit
violence against innocent civilian targets in acts that are
premeditated and involve “ideological and political rather than
criminal motive[s],” as sexual violence is one practice of socially
organized male power. 238 MacKinnon further contends that both
patterns of violence resemble dispersed armed conflict, but the
world’s response to them has been markedly different: while “[t]he
post-September 11th paradigm shift . . . permitt[ed] potent
response[s] to massive nonstate violence against civilians,” 239
international law fails to address violence against women as one form
of terrorism or war crimes.240 MacKinnon further argues that just as
acts of terrorism “are crimes against humanity . . . , [so] is much
violence against women, making both internationally illegal”241 and
justifying international response under the genocide legal category.242
MacKinnon’s arguments are undoubtedly controversial, making it
unlikely that the international community will declare “violence



234. See ABRAMS, supra note 13, at 76.
235. See H.R. 1270, 112th Cong. (2011).
236. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2006).
237. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Women’s September 11th: Rethinking the International
Law of Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 1-2 (2006).
238. Id. at 11-12.
239. Id. at 3.
240. Id. at 13-14 (“If women were seen to be a group, capable of destruction as such, the
term genocide would be apt . . . .”).
241. Id. at 13.
242. Id. at 15-26.
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against women” as one form of international terrorism. Arguably,
MacKinnon’s account fails to address the substantive differences
between terrorism and violence against women, particularly the fact
that a major feature defining terrorism is the specific intent to coerce
governments to change their policies and actions. This political
motivation is clearly lacking in the context of violence against women.
However, despite the marked differences, international sex
trafficking implicates other defining features that characterize
terrorism, as McKinnon notes. Using a terrorism offense in a
particular case does not require embracing the “violence against
women as terrorism” paradigm as a whole. Instead, unlimited
prosecutorial discretion provides prosecutors with a theory that may
be invoked once a plausible case presents itself. Take, for instance, a
hypothetical in which a sex trafficking organization escalates the
measures it employs by using bombing for the purpose of trafficking
prostitutes from Mexico to the U.S. Again, nothing in the broad
statutory language prevents prosecutors from charging the
defendants with bombing places of public use by invoking the theory
that using bombs for the purposes of trafficking prostitutes meets the
elements of this offense. 243 Using the broadly worded terrorism
prohibitions to prosecute a specific international sex trafficking case
is therefore not an implausible scenario.
V. NARROWING THE SCOPE OF TERRORISM OFFENSES
The risks of unconstrained prosecutorial discretion warrant the
adoption of measures to curb prosecutorial authority and reduce the
potential for misusing it. However, these risks generally remain
beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny.244 Scholars have long proposed
that courts exercise heightened judicial review of prosecutorial
charging decisions, 245 but these proposals have been rejected.
Proposing judicial oversight of prosecutorial charging decisions in the
area of terrorism prosecutions is an unrealistic solution because
courts typically uphold the prosecutorial practice of unconstrained
discretion in deciding whether to prosecute defendants, who to
prosecute, and what offenses to charge with.246 Scholars have also
suggested that internal prosecutorial guidelines provide a



243. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2332f (2006).
244. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (noting a list of
factors that are not readily susceptible to the type of analysis the courts are competent to
engage in; therefore, recognizing that prosecutorial decisions are “particularly ill-suited to
judicial review”).
245. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521, 1568-72 (1981) (advocating heightened judicial review on prosecutorial discretion).
246. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
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mechanism to cabin prosecutorial discretion. 247 These types of
proposals are also unlikely to constrain prosecutorial discretion in
terrorism prosecutions, as they are merely internal guidelines, rather
than law, and the scope of their adherence as well as the ability to
enforce them remain unclear.248
Given the shortcomings of procedural measures to alleviate the
concerns regarding misuse of terrorism offenses in contexts that are
unrelated to terrorism, this part calls for a substantive solution. It
suggests the adoption of a legislative reform of terrorism offenses
that would not only limit the scope of these offenses solely to the
context of terrorism, but would also distinguish between “ordinary”
crime, such as shooting sprees and terrorism. Arguably, a proposal
for a legislative reform is a strong medicine to cure the problem of
unconstrained prosecutorial discretion in the area of terrorism
prosecutions. However, this proposal comes as a last resort, after
acknowledging that alternative solutions have failed to cure the
problems identified above.
A. Specific Intent to Coerce Governments as Terrorism Offenses’
Mental State
The proposal advocated in this Section rests on the premise that
political motivation is the distinct feature separating “ordinary”
crime from terrorism. However, in terrorism-related legislation the
defendant’s political motivation does not play any role in the
definition of the offenses, resulting in overinclusive offenses, which
are sometimes misused by prosecutors. The following proposal thus
advocates the adoption of a critical element to narrow the scope of
terrorism-related prohibitions by incorporating the defendant’s
political motivation into the definition of these offenses. However,
rather than making the defendant’s motive an element of the offense,
I suggest that the defendant’s specific intent to coerce governments
to change their actions and policies be made a necessary element of
all terrorism offenses. In other words, to win a conviction, the
prosecution would have to prove that the defendant engaged in
violent acts that typically characterize terrorism with the intent to
coerce governments to change their actions and policies.



247. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing
“Discretionary Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 200-02 (2004) (discussing
internal guidelines as a means to limit prosecutorial discretion). 
248. See Ellen S. Podgor, Pleading Blindly, 80 MISS. L.J. 1633, 1636-38 (2011)
(discussing the shortcomings of internal guidelines).
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1. General: The Relationship Between Intent and Motive
The proposal to make terrorism offenses specific intent crimes
raises concerns about whether the substantive criminal law is
equipped to consider political motivation in committing the crime of
terrorism. One might argue that the proposal conflates specific intent
and motive and that the defendant’s motive to commit a crime should
not affect his or her punishment. Should the defendant’s reasons for
committing a crime matter for the purposes of imposing criminal
liability, and if so, why?
Criminal law theorists continue to debate the role of motives in
determining liability or grade of an offense. 249 Scholars today
question the famous statement that “hardly any rule of penal law is
more definitely settled than that motive is irrelevant.”250 Traditional
criminal law theory asserts that while specific intent in committing a
crime is a legally permissible element, motives ought not be relevant
to criminal liability or grading of an offense. 251 The relationship
between motive and intent “has caused the theorists considerable
difficulty for years,” and the distinction between a defendant’s
allegedly irrelevant motive and his legally relevant intent is often
ambiguous. 252 Moreover, in contrast with the traditional view that
motives are always irrelevant, scholars have argued that they are a
relevant factor in many existing offenses.253 Prominent criminal law
scholar Paul H. Robinson argues that motive ought to be, and
commonly is, an element in determining liability or grade of
offense.254 Robinson contends that “every time an offense definition
contains the phrase ‘with the purpose to . . . ,’ the law takes as an
offense element the [defendant’s] motive, the cause of his or her act.”255
Furthermore, despite the scholarly controversy regarding motive’s
role in criminal law, most scholars agree that as a practical matter,
criminal law often does reflect a perpetrator’s reasons for acting,
noting the various ways that motives already influence the criminal



249. See, e.g., Guyora Binder, The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
1 (2002). 
250. See Id. at 45-65 (quoting JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
88 (The Lawbook Exchange ed., 2d ed. 2005) (1960)); see also ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON
AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAW 36 (Butterworths ed., 2d ed.
2001) (“It is as firmly established in legal doctrine as any rule can be that motive is
irrelevant to responsibility . . . .”).
251. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 463 (Oxford Univ.
Press ed. 2000) (1978).
252. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 272 (5th ed. 2010).
253. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 121 (3d ed. 2001).
254. See Robinson, supra note 83, at 608 (noting that motive “should alter liability if
and only if it alters an actor’s blameworthiness for the prohibited act. Some motives alter
our judgments of blameworthiness, others do not; distinguishing between the two is the
challenge put to criminal code drafters”).
255. Id. at 606-07.
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law. 256 Scholars further note that “criminal law’s use of motive in
defining offense liability often goes undisputed when other terms are
used to obfuscate the role of motive. . . . ‘[S]pecific intent’ crime . . .
could be recast as a crime defined by motive.”257 Moreover, scholars
include specific intent crimes as examples of when the criminal law
treats motive as relevant. 258 The proposal to narrow terrorism
offenses by making the defendant’s specific intent a necessary
element of terrorism offenses is therefore neither inconsistent nor
objectionable from the standpoint of current criminal law theory, and
examining an array of specific intent statutes demonstrates the
weakness of the “motive is always irrelevant” claim in determining
criminal liability.
2. Why Is Specific Intent Preferable to Motive?
While relying upon the defendant’s motive may be consistent with
traditional criminal law theory, it does not follow that making
political motivation an element of the crime is necessarily the best
criterion for defining terrorism offenses. 259 Using the defendant’s
political motivation as an element of the crime creates special
difficulties in implementation and application. 260 Proving motive is
extremely challenging, as it involves the defendant’s internal
personal drive to commit a crime. Making political motivation an
element of terrorism offenses would therefore impose an unworkable
hurdle on the prosecution and infringe on the nation’s endeavors in
fighting the actual risks of terrorism.
While criminal law theory would permit the use of political
motivation as an element of terrorism offenses, an alternative—and
more prudent legislative strategy—would be to incorporate this
requirement indirectly by making specific intent to coerce
governments a necessary element of terrorism offenses. While
specific intent to coerce government actions or policies is inherently
driven by political motivation, motive itself is not made an explicit
element in defining the crime of terrorism. Moreover, in contrast
with motive, which focuses on the defendant’s internal personal drive
to act, intent implicates the more objective reason behind committing
the act, which in the case of terrorism is the intention to influence
and affect government actions and policies. 261 This specific intent



256. See, e.g, DRESSLER, supra note 253 (“A defendant’s motive is often relevant in the
criminal law.”).
257. Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An
Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552, 594 (2007). 
258. See Elaine M. Chiu, The Challenge of Motive in the Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 653, 668 (2005).
259. But cf. Robinson, supra note 83, at 606-09.
260. But cf. id. at 608.
261. See id. at 608 & n.5.
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may be proven by providing evidence about a defendant’s violent
political activities or affiliations with a designated terrorist
organization. Proving the objective intention to bring about political
change through violent conduct is therefore not only a less
objectionable option from a traditional criminal law theory
perspective, but also a pragmatically feasible requirement.
Furthermore, making specific intent to coerce governments to
change their actions or policies an element of terrorism offenses is
already incorporated into the criminal codes of several state and
federal provisions. 262 These prohibitions, however, fall short of
making specific intent to coerce governments to change their policies
or actions a necessary element of all terrorism-related offenses.
Instead, such specific intent is only made an alternative requirement:
the prosecution can choose between establishing the defendant’s
specific intent to intimidate a civilian population or the defendant’s
specific intent to coerce governments. Moreover, many other
terrorism-related offenses do not incorporate any form of specific
intent as an element of the offense, relying instead on the massive
harm typically inflicted to infer the terrorism classification. The
result is an over-inclusive prohibition that allows for the
prosecution of a wide range of criminal conducts not necessarily
related to the terrorism context. The proposal advocated here would
make specific intent to coerce governments to change their actions or
policies a necessary element of terrorism crimes, and the specific
intent requirement would be made an element of all terrorismrelated prohibitions.
3. The Parallels Between Hate Crimes and Terrorism
Hate crimes provide an illustrative analogy to terrorism offenses,
supporting the rationales behind the proposal to make specific intent
to coerce governments a part of the defendant’s mental state. To
convict a defendant with a hate crime the prosecution must prove
that the crime was motivated by an anti-group motive and that the
victim was selected by reason of his or her actual or perceived race,
color, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation. As Andrew E.
Taslitz has suggested, “Hate criminals generally use their criminal
conduct to express their contempt for, and perceived superiority over,



262. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25(1) (McKinney 2012) (“A person is guilty of a
crime of terrorism when, with intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence
the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of
a unit of government by murder, assassination or kidnapping, he or she commits a
specified offense.”). 
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various identifiable groups, based on, for example, their race,
ethnicity, gender, religion, or sexual orientation.”263
Admittedly, a main feature of hate crimes is the motive
requirement. Moreover, hate crimes are highly controversial
precisely because of motive’s critical role in defining this
crime: several state courts have struck down these laws as
unconstitutional, holding that criminal law could not punish
motives. 264 The Supreme Court, however, reversed these decisions,
holding that states could lawfully enhance punishment for conduct
based on disfavored motive.265
Scholars have debated whether motive affects the scope of harm
inflicted by the crime. Some scholars argue that motive is irrelevant
to criminal liability, because it does not generally affect the harm
inflicted by the criminal conduct.266 Wayne McCormack, for example,
contends that motive ought not be an element of terrorism offenses
because it does not affect the extent of the harm intended and
inflicted, and it does not influence the understanding of the criminal
activity.267 In sharp contrast with the view that motives do not affect
the scope of the harm, Paul H. Robinson contends that hate crimes
increase the scope of the harm intended or inflicted by the offense.268
Robinson suggests that hate crimes ought to “focus [on] the greater
harm caused and intended by [these crimes] than would occur in an
analogous offense without the hate-motivation.”269 “A greater harm to
a greater number of people,” contends Robinson, is more likely to
result when “the conduct seeks to intimidate . . . an identifiable
group, than in instances where the same conduct does not target a
particular group.”270 Some scholars suggest that hate crimes can be
viewed as a close cousin to terrorism in that the target of an offense
is selected on the basis of group identity, not individual behavior, and
because the effect of both is to wreak terror on a greater number of
people than those directly affected by the violence. 271 Indeed,
disfavored political motive is a distinct feature common to both hate
crimes and terrorism, as one scholar writes, “[Hate crimes] are



263. Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual
Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2000). 
264. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 814 (Wis. 1992) (“The statute is
directed solely at the subjective motivation of the actor—his or her prejudice. Punishment
of one’s thought, however repugnant the thought, is unconstitutional.”).
265. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993).
266. See FLETCHER, supra note 251. 
267. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 19.
268. Robinson, supra note 83.
269. Id. 
270. Id.
271. See generally Cynthia Lee, Hate Crimes and the War on Terror, in 5 HATE CRIMES:
RESPONDING TO HATE CRIME 139-66 (Barbara Perry & Frederick M. Lawrence eds. 2009)
(addressing one aspect of the relationships between hate crimes and the war on terror).
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assaults aimed at the expressive goals of demeaning . . . a victim
because of membership in this group.” 272 Another scholar stresses
that “[t]errorism and torture both share some characteristics with
hate crimes.”273
Therefore, a common argument to support both hate crimes and
terrorism legislation is that these crimes merit enhanced punishment
due to the greater harm they cause, and because both crimes are
committed with an underlying intent to harm and influence others,
beyond those specific victims who are directly affected. Indeed, hate
crimes are justified precisely because they rest on the premise that a
defendant’s discriminatory motive to commit the crime results in
inflicting greater harm. Applying a similar rationale in the terrorismrelated context demonstrates that separately criminalizing violent
conduct intended to coerce governments is justified because this form
of crime typically results in greater harm to a greater number of
individuals, thus justifying harsher penalties.
B. Narrowing the Scope of Terrorism Offenses in Comparative Law
Comparative law provides
the proposal to incorporate
element of terrorism crimes.
example. “[T]errorist activity”
Code, in part, as follows:

an additional perspective supporting
political motivation as a necessary
Canadian law offers an illustrative
is defined in the Canadian Criminal

An act or omission . . . that is committed . . . in whole or in
part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective
or cause, and . . . in whole or in part with the intention of
intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with
regard to its security, including its economic security, or
compelling a person, a government or a domestic or
an international organization to do or to refrain from doing
any act . . . . 274
In contrast with American antiterrorism law, Canadian law
explicitly makes political, ideological, or religious motivation a part of
the definition of terrorist crimes. Incorporating the requirement for
apolitical, religious or ideological purpose, objective, or cause
significantly narrows the potential scope of terrorism offenses.



272. Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965,
1040 (2008). 
273. Karima Bennoune, Terror/Torture, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 17 (2008) (noting
that “[b]oth torture and terror involve the infliction of extreme suffering, often on a victim
chosen on a basis which may include discriminatory motives, often with a message
intended for a broad audience, and meant to impact the lives of many”).
274. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 83.01(1).
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Furthermore, it effectively limits the prosecutorial authority to use
terrorism offenses in cases unrelated to the terrorism context.
Moreover, as noted earlier, American terrorism prohibitions make
intent to intimidate a civilian population and intent to coerce
governments alternative rather than cumulative requirements, thus
allowing prosecutors to invoke the terrorism theory based solely on
establishing the “intent to intimidate civilians” element. In contrast,
Canadian law requires the prosecution to separately prove two
elements: both the political, religious, or ideological motivation as
well as the intent to intimidate civilians or the government. This
legislative approach offers a limiting mechanism, ensuring that
terrorism charges are used only in the terrorism context.
Furthermore, Canadian law provides an additional legislative
measure to narrow the scope of terrorism offenses by limiting the
harm inflicted by the offenses to that of human lives.275 “A common
feature of post-9/11 anti-terrorism laws has been [the adoption of]
very broad definitions of terrorism that go beyond the murder and
maiming of civilians.”276 This legislative strategy enables prosecutors
to bring charges under terrorism-related offenses in cases involving
crimes against government property that fall short of causing death
or serious bodily injury. In contrast, Canadian law does not define
“terrorist activity” to include property damage. Rather, the Canadian
definition of “terrorist activity” is limited to harm to life or serious
bodily injury. Canadian law does, however, criminalize politically or
religiously motivated damage to property “if causing such damage is
likely to result in the conduct or harm” that “causes death or serious
bodily [injury] . . . , endangers a person’s life, . . . or causes a serious
risk to” public health or safety.”277
C. The Proposal’s Advantages
The proposal to make specific intent to coerce governments to
change their actions or policies the required mens rea for convicting a
defendant with terrorism offenses carries several important
advantages. First, basing criminal liability for terrorism crimes on
the specific intent element is consistent with one of the key premises
of criminal law theory, that is, punishing a defendant according
to the extent of the harm caused, risked, or intended by his or
her criminal conduct, and thus greater harms justify imposing
greater liability.
The proposal advocated here seeks to build on this premise,
suggesting that crimes of terrorism ought to be defined “[b]y focusing



275. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46, § 83.01(b)(ii).
276. Roach, supra note 165, at 2173.
277. See Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46, § 83.01(b)(ii).
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on the additional harms” that acts of terrorism cause and intend to
cause “as a basis for greater liability.”278 Conduct intended to coerce
governments to change their actions or policies is inherently intended
to cause greater harm on a greater number of victims. The criminal
law often makes the defendant’s intent a relevant element in defining
criminal liability or grading an offense, where the defendant commits
an underlying crime with a purpose to cause greater harm to a
greater number of people. 279 Proposing to add the specific intent
element to the definition of terrorism offenses is consistent with this
legislative strategy because an inherent feature of terrorism is its
likeliness to result in greater harm to a greater number of people due
to its double-target: terrorist acts are committed to coerce
governments’ actions and policies by intimidating the citizens of
those governments.
Second, focusing on specific intent to coerce governments as the
focal point of the offense of terrorism provides a significant limiting
mechanism, ensuring that terrorism charges are brought only when
the defendant commits politically motivated crimes. This legislative
strategy effectively constrains the overbroad reach of terrorism
offenses. In order to successfully limit the reach of terrorism offenses,
the defendant’s political intent to coerce governments ought to be
made a necessary element of these offenses. Currently, while many
scholars agree that terrorism is a pattern of conduct motivated by
political aspirations, that it is intended to coerce governments to
change their policies and actions, these features are not made
elements of terrorism offenses, resulting in a gap between the
common understanding of terrorism and its criminal prohibitions. 280
Adopting a specific intent element would fill this gap by confining
prosecutorial authority to use terrorism prohibitions only upon
proving that the defendant engaged in violent acts with the intent to
coerce governments to change their actions and policies.
Moreover, the proposal’s focus on specific intent to coerce
governments rather than on a more generalized requirement such as
intent to intimidate civilians further ensures that terrorism
offenses are not overinclusive. Making intent to intimidate civilians
an element of terrorism, as many provisions currently do, fails to



278. See Robinson, supra note 83.
279. Various state statutes prohibit bias-motivated crimes, such as unlawful cross
burning, intended to intimidate a group of people on the basis of race, ethnicity, or another
bias-motivated feature. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1707 (2012); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/12-7.6 (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.095 (West 2012); WASH. REV.
CODE. ANN. § 9A.36.080(2) (West 2012); see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 48485 (1993) (upholding a criminal statute which enhanced a defendant’s sentence whenever
the defendant intentionally selects his victim based on the victim’s race or nationality). See
generally DRESSLER, supra note 253. 
280. See supra Part I. 
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capture its essence and ultimately results in an overinclusive
definition. 281 What distinguishes terrorism from other crime is
its specific intent to coerce governments, while intimidating
an unidentifiable group of victims is merely the means to
achieve this end. Making specific intent an element of terrorism
offenses, therefore, adds a critical feature that is unique to the
terrorism context.
Third, grounding terrorism statutes in the requirement of political
intent to coerce governments would provide a necessary measure for
accurately classifying crimes. Recall that under current law, the
distinction between “ordinary” crime and “terrorism” is often murky,
with no clear legal standard to distinguish between them.282 Making
specific intent to coerce governments an element of terrorism offenses
ensures that terrorism offenses are used to prosecute only terrorism
crimes and helps facilitate prosecutorial decisions in classifying what
types of conduct fall under terrorism prohibitions, thus curbing
prosecutorial discretion in this area. Furthermore, adopting the
proposal would result in reducing the potential for misusing
terrorism prohibitions in the wrong cases, for the wrong reasons. The
specific intent element would serve as a practical bar to legislatively
prevent prosecutors from using terrorism offenses to prosecute cases
that are unrelated to terrorism.
Fourth, making specific intent to coerce governments an element
of terrorism crimes is a feasible requirement. A potential objection to
the proposal is that it would impose an unworkable burden on the
prosecution and jeopardize government endeavors to combat
terrorism. Therefore, one might argue that making specific intent an
element of terrorism offenses is unwarranted. Indeed proving the
defendant’s specific intent in committing a crime often creates an
onerous hurdle for the prosecution. However, adding this
requirement as a necessary element in terrorism offenses is already a
common element in other contexts, such as larceny, which requires
intent to steal; kidnapping, which requires intent to hold for ransom;
and attempt and conspiracy, which require intent to commit a crime.
While there are evidentiary difficulties in establishing the specific
intent element, convictions are still obtained under these offenses.
Evidentiary hurdles thus should not stand in the way of making
specific intent to coerce government an element of all terrorism
offenses. Finally, adopting the proposal would not compromise the
effective enforcement of criminal law: crimes that do not meet the
definition of the narrower terrorism offenses would not remain
outside the scope of criminal regulation. Rather, when the defining



281. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(B) (2006).
282. See supra Part II.
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features of terrorism, such as political motivation, are lacking,
“ordinary” criminal law would come into play, enabling prosecution.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has adopted the underlying premise supporting
antiterrorism law: terrorism poses significant threats to America’s
national security. Therefore, it has endorsed the conclusion that
politically motivated crimes that inflict (or are intended to inflict)
substantial harm on a large number of people, and are intended to
coerce governments to change their actions or policies, ought to be
severely prosecuted and punished under specialized terrorism
offenses. However, at the same time, the Article has posited that in
order to successfully combat the real risks of terrorism, the criminal
justice system ought to clearly distinguish between “ordinary” crime
and terrorism by accurately classifying the type of conduct that
meets the definition of actual terrorism.
This Article has demonstrated the criminal justice system’s failure
at this classification task due to two reasons: First, the defining
features of terrorism—mainly the defendant’s political motivation in
committing the crime—are not made elements of terrorism offenses.
Second, the authority to make the classification is placed solely in the
hands of prosecutors who sometimes misuse terrorism statutes in
cases that are unrelated to terrorism. The Article has elaborated on
the perils of this prosecutorial practice, contending that its
continuance carries critical implications for the enforcement of
criminal law.
The Article has suggested that to alleviate these problems, the
authority to classify which crimes amount to terrorism ought to be
reserved to legislatures, and that legislative reform is needed to limit
the scope of terrorism offenses by making specific intent to coerce
governments to change their policies and actions an element of
terrorism offenses. This legislative strategy would ensure not only
that prosecutors are able to charge defendants with terrorism
prohibitions only in terrorism-related cases, but would also
prevent them from using such offenses in the wrong cases, for the
wrong reasons.
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